ABSTRACT
In a useful periodisation, Carey (1995: 6) describes the three phases of the Indonesian occupation of East Timor as the period of conquest from 1975-79; of partial consolidation from 1979-89, leading to the ‘opening’ of the territory in January 1989; and thereafter, the rapid unraveling of Jakarta’s authority. The final decade saw the visit of Pope John Paul II in 1989, the Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991, and the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta in 1996. Alongside geopolitical developments that undermined international support for Indonesia’s forced integration of East Timor, one clear factor was the failure to convert the younger generation, or Gerasaun Foun, to the cause of integration. The rise of the civilian clandestine organisations in the late-1980s, and their early successes, would lead to a major change in resistance strategy, emphasising clandestine civilian activity in the towns. In concert with the end of the Cold War, the Asian financial crisis, and the fall of Suharto regime in 1998, the highly organised clandestine resistance changed the momentum, making the financial and political costs of governing the restive province less sustainable by the mid-1990s.
