ABSTRACT
In the previous chapter I claimed that even though we value freedom highly, not all freedoms are equally valuable and some are downright undesirable and ought to be restricted. I said nothing, however, about the vexed questions of who should decide which freedoms ought to be restricted and who should have the authority to restrict them. Ever since flaws were noticed in the idea that might is right, people have been trying to explain what justifies the restriction of liberty by those in positions of power, what makes their power legitimate, and what is the basis of the individual's obligation to obey a legitimate authority. One enduring explanation, known as contract theory, is that limitations of individual freedom are legitimate when people have agreed to accept them by forming a contract or covenant with their rulers or government. The theory is usually used to explain political obligation, but the principle can be applied to the relationship between anyone in a position of power and those who accept their power as legitimate. In the social contract people are deemed to have voluntarily given up some of their freedom in exchange for other benefits, especially the benefit of the security to be found in a law-governed society.
