ABSTRACT
This chapter aims to improve a key aspect of the national security decision making process, the civil-military nexus at the Pentagon, by moderating the effects of potential tyranny in the position of the Secretary of Defense. The story of US civil-military relations over past four decades has been one of far ranging swings in one-sided domination or questionable levels of over-influence by one side or the other. When the termination of conflict during the First Persian Gulf War was covered, there are times when issues within the civil-military nexus clearly have a lead. Unity of command still applies in a Madisonian approach to civil-military relations. Despite potential weaknesses with a Madisonian approach, it is still worth pursuing. The significant move proposed in Madisonian theoretical model pertains specifically to interactions within the Department of Defense, where the Madisonian approach provides a different way for conceptualizing the key relationships in top-tier positions the president's political appointees and the nation's top military officers.
