ABSTRACT
We do not ordinarily think that there is a serious question as to whether we ever actually see the moon, smell an orange, or feel the steering wheel of the car we are driving; but as is well known, what is not thought open to doubt in ordinary life, or for that matter in the sciences, is frequently thought to be a proper subject of doubt and of serious and protracted debate in philosophy. Philosophers who, in an ordinary circumstance would not dream of contesting each others’ claims to be seeing or not to be seeing certain things, disagree over whether we ever perceive physical things. Some important philosophers have held views, which they have supported with reasoned considerations, according to which the common notation that we perceive things is a myth, while others have opposed such views, and have maintained that we do in some sense perceive things. Thus Moore has said: ‘I have, indeed, once met a philosopher who told me I was making a great mistake in thinking that such objects [a particular chair, a particular tree, etc.] are ever seen. But I think this philosopher was certainly wrong, and was thinking that the various correct uses of “see” are limited in a way in which in fact they are not limited.’ 1
