ABSTRACT
The shift from conflict to negotiation, or from war to peace, has proveda particularly difficult one in the context of protracted conflict.Indeed, continuing a war can be the most comfortable option as it represents an almost predictable certainty in the face of the uncertainties of peace and change. In most cases the decision to engage in a peace process has been motivated by a stalemate which makes it clear that neither side can completely defeat the other, the presence of spokespersons for both sides, and the availability of a formula for the way out (Zartman, 1989). The 1973 October war presented the possibility for all of these. Renewed military confrontation made it clear, on the one hand, that Egypt could not defeat Israel despite the element of surprise and acquisition of Soviet arms, and, on the other hand, that Israel, despite being victorious in all Arab-Israeli wars, was not protected from Arab attacks. Further, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s determination to find a settlement provided both sides with a formula which made it easy to move beyond a disengagement agreement. And finally, the determination of President Anwar Sadat and the willingness of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to take the risks of peace made successful Israeli-Egyptian negotiations possible.
