Foreign Policy

It was a basic assumption of Victorian foreign policy, and of Victorian public opinion, that 'Britannia rules the waves'. ¹ An article by Sir Robert Giffen, the statistician, on 'The Standard of Strength for Our Army' (Nineteenth Century, June 1901) started from an expectation of naval supremacy. 'The condition of the British Empire without command of the sea is hardly conceivable . . . We should be liable to blockade at home and to the ruin of our foreign commerce, nor could we keep India or any other dependency by force.' The generals often argued that a naval disaster might allow an invader to land, and that therefore the army needed to be strong; but they were answered variously that British naval strength made disaster unlikely; that a small enemy landing could be defeated by the existing regular, militia, and volunteer troops in the United Kingdom; and that without conscription (which was unacceptable) no British army could be raised which would be large enough to resist a foreign landing in strength. This last point made it the more necessary to ensure the continuance of naval supremacy in home waters - at the same time as supremacy over the world's oceans remained hardly less essential for the protection of the British Empire and of British trade. A large part of this trade now consisted of food importation. Admiral Sir John Fisher, the dynamic Edwardian First Sea Lord, contended that if the navy were not supreme, no army however large would be of any use. 'It's not invasion we have to fear if our Navy is beaten. IT'S STARVATION!'