ABSTRACT
The relation between the knowledge-stock and artefacts seems to be open-ended, even though the notion of embodied knowledge is common in the theory of the production function. Interestingly, the problem of fixing knowledge ontologically is very much the same one as fixing the relation between genotype or phenotype and its environment. In the naturalistic approach to knowledge, knowledge is no longer something that is related to an epistemic subject, namely the Cartesian mind, but knowledge is a process that is embodied in evolving matter-energy structures, following the principle of bimodality. More specifically, embedding economic explanations into a cultural science framework means that rationality cannot be reduced to mere formal principles, but always has to be seen as embedded rationality. Looking at human technology, the main reason for rejecting atomistic conceptions of knowledge is that all innovations take place under radical uncertainty, or under a state of ignorance, corresponding to the notion of 'blindness' in Darwinian approaches to novel variants.
