CONCEPTUALISM AND THE ONTOLOGICAL INDEPENDENCE OF CAUSE AND EFFECT
In his reply to Place (p. 140ff.), Martin fails to address Place’s submission (p. 118) that his (Martin’s) Limit View of the relation between categorical/ -qualitative and dispositional properties fails to allow for the causal relation which, on Place’s view, holds between the dispositional properties of the whole and the properties of its structure, both categorical/ qualitative and dispositional. There would seem to be two reasons for this omission. In the first place, by taking as his example the case of an elementary particle which has no parts, no microstructure, which can account for its dispositional property (the ‘charm’ of the quark), Martin aims to finesse the issue which is central to the debate between Place and Armstrong, the ‘reduction vs. non-reduction debates’ (p. 74). Second, the fact that Place agrees with him in holding that
dispositional properties…play a basic role in causality, (p. 81)
and hence, given his view of causality, that there is both a purely categorical and a dispositional aspect to every causal relation, conceals the difference between the two views over the relation between dispositional properties and their categorical/structural basis.