ABSTRACT
Dispositions have become a central issue in philosophy but the focus of attention has been on all the metaphysical issues they raise. Ethics rests on a number of notions that are either dispositional in character or involve real dispositions—some say powers—at work. Intentionality doesn't explain dispositions but dispositions explain intentionality. The modality of intentionality derives from the dispositions upon which it rests. The cerebral palsy case fails to count as agency for lack of both intentionality and autonomy. The chapter seeks only to show that there is after all a close connection between dispositions and ethics, hence metaphysics and ethics. E. J. Lowe suggests a normative account of nature in which dispositions can be understood in normative terms. The chapter explains how ethics, or at least a sizeable portion of it, is ultimately grounded in the dispositions of things, including the powers of people.
