ABSTRACT
Introduction The mini-crises occurred like clockwork. Some event on Taiwan led China to respond with dire warnings. Tensions rose, the United States (US) inserted itself, and soon tensions declined. The triggers for these mini-crises are well known: President Lee Teng-hui’s 1995 visit to the United States; his 1999 “special state-to-state” formula; the presidential election of 2000; and the 2003-4 presidential campaign. What is less understood is the United States’ role of dual deterrence. In each of these episodes, Washington sought to constrain both Beijing and Taipei from actions that might spiral toward a conflict that would damage its own interests in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Dual deterrence is not an easy job, in part because there are competing American interests at play: respect for a fellow democracy-Taiwan-versus economic and foreign policy benefits of a cooperative relationship with China. As one of the most difficult tasks that the United States faces, this paper explores the dimensions of this challenge.
