ABSTRACT
Introduction In December 2003, Major General Peng Guangqian and Senior Colonel Luo Yuan publicly listed the 2008 Olympics, loss of foreign investment, deterioration in foreign relations, economic recession, and “necessary” casualties by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as the costs China would willingly bear in order to “reunify the motherland” by force.1 The significance of this is twofold; first, it is the first time China has provided a specific list of acceptable “costs”; and second, it was stated by two PLA officers in charge of strategic studies at the Chinese Academy of Military Science.2 A further statement made on 17 May 2004 by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) State Council and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee, claims that if Taiwan should provoke “major incidents of Taiwan independence, the Chinese people will crush their schemes firmly and thoroughly at any cost.”3 The truly intriguing and critical question is whether China would still be willing to use force if the list of costs was longer and the price substantially higher than Beijing’s stated expectations.
