ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that international human rights norms, jurisprudence and methodologies have not generated principles that could assist states and tribes in the governance of indigenous membership disputes. In fact, by overemphasizing individual rights to belong to minority groups, these methodologies can undermine the indigenous self-governance and jurisdictional arrangements that increasingly structure settler-state constitutionalism. In developing this argument, the chapter draws primarily on examples from the public and tribal law of membership in the Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the USA (CANZUS) states and on the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee (HRC) that oversees the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). It suggests that, while the structure and ideology of international human rights law is such that the interests of tribes are almost always subordinated to the interests of aspirant members and the public, CANZUS states have been able to augment domestic human rights law in order to provide normative space for tribal self-constitution.
