ABSTRACT
Since World War II, Japan has been accustomed to providing international disaster relief rather than accepting it. After the 1995 Kobe quake, the Japanese government refused foreign government o ers due to national pride, bureaucratic hurdles and putative Japanese exceptionalism (Fukushima 1995). Despite several major earthquakes since 1945 when US military basing began in Japan, these resources have never been used for earthquake relief. In an about face, after the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake, Japanese leaders immediately requested assistance from Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and the United States, including from the United States Forces Japan (USFJ) (Reuters 2011). USFJ has nearly 40,000 troops and billions of dollars of assets on Japanese soil. Arguably, it took a Chernobyl-level nuclear disaster at Fukushima-an event clearly beyond domestic expertise and controlfor Japan to call upon the USFJ for support. Critical as it was, the nuclear disaster was not the only factor infl uencing Japanese leaders to seek foreign assistance. As business scholar Erik Werker suggests, international disaster relief is heavily infl uenced by the disaster-stricken nation’s domestic politics (Werker 2010). The scale of the tsunami damage, changes in the role of Japan’s Self Defense Forces (SDF), instability in the domestic political climate, and simmering bilateral tensions over realignment of US bases in Okinawa were all factors in the decision to seek US military support. In retrospect, Japan’s acceptance of this support might turn out to be a bellwether of signifi cant changes in Japan’s self-image on the international stage. On pragmatic grounds, even the harshest critics of US military disaster relief after the Tōhoku quake face di culty suggesting that Japan, and residents of the quake stricken area in particular, would have been better o without it.
