ABSTRACT
Kant’s brief chapter, “The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding,” appears under the heading of the “Transcendental Doctrine of Judgment” in the Critique of Pure Reason. Judgment refers both to the determinative judgment Kant develops in the analytic of the First Critique, but also to the special cases of aesthetic and teleological (or what Lyotard calls reflective) judgment treated in the Critique of Judgment. This relationship between the conceptions of judgment in the First and Third Critiques is supplementary or exemplary, but keep in mind that even in the Third Critique Kant deals with a general notion of judgment. He does not entitle his work, “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” or “Critique of Reflective Judgment.” The claim of the title as well as the book is to treat judgment in general, and this claim turns back upon the First Critique such that determinate judgment according to concepts becomes a special case of judgment in general (as Lyotard claims).
