ABSTRACT
During the negotiations for the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) as well as the more recently adopted Treaty of Nice (2001) the main actors in the European Union expressed significant concern that the entry of new member states might reduce the effectiveness of the Union’s institutions.2 The possible institutional implications of enlargement are clearly expressed in a report submitted by Jean-Luc Dehaene, Richard von Weizsäcker, and David Simon on the invitation of Commission President Prodi. In this report, they state that ‘[a] significant increase in the number of participants automatically increases problems of decision-making and management’ (Dehaene et al. 1999: 6). More members of the Council, for instance, would increase the risk of deadlock if unanimity rule were to be used, reducing the Union’s capacity to respond to policy problems and to take decisions. The ‘three wise men’ suggested, among other things, reducing the use of unanimity rule and expand the use of majority voting prior to enlargement. However, the claim that institutional reform is a condition for enlargement can be questioned. Earlier enlargements of the Union were accompanied by debates on institutional reform, yet member states did not substantially change their decision-making rules and procedures.3 Why then, for the next enlargement, should enlargement and institutional reform be seen as connected issues?
