ABSTRACT
Fighting the Cold War was different from fighting the Second World War. In the latter, no one needed persuasion to fight. In the Cold War, how to combat the communist threat was not self-evident and conflicting national interests within the Western Alliance impinged upon the priority of combating the enemy. Running an alliance and trying to attract noncommitted nations into the Western camp further complicated the politics of Anglo-American relations and, with the USA now the undisputed leader of the West, there was understandable friction with the British as they adjusted to their secondary-power status. Leadership also placed responsibility on the USA to be the most implacable opponent of communism and impartial in dealing with its allies. Both those requirements caused problems. On a number of occasions Britain felt that there was more freedom to manoeuvre than did the USA and sought conciliation with the Soviets or the Chinese: this elicited charges of disloyalty and appeasement from Washington. The British also resented the USA formally treating them on a par with other Allies, especially when it prejudiced the renewal of wartime intimacy. In addition to these circumstances, Americans also had more narrowly based reasons of selfinterest for putting distance between themselves and the British. The USA
did not want to co-operate with Britain on atomic weaponry until the late 1950s because, notwithstanding the successful British nuclear test in 1952, she had nothing of value to offer the USA in return. The USA did not want an Atlantic community that would draw Britain away from European integration. Nor did they wish to consort with the British in a way that would contaminate them with colonialism in the Middle and Far East.
