ABSTRACT
Globalisation, in all its varying forms and dynamics, varies in its impact. Within the developing world we are witnessing a division between the more developed developing countries, and those that seem incapable – for whatever reason – of accruing any benefit from a more global world economy. This is producing ongoing consequences for the relationship of those states that are (relatively) strong within local regions with those that are in a more subordinate position. Grugel and Hout argue that ‘globalisation . . . seem[s] to presage a reconfiguration of the South . . . and to pave the way for a reconstitution of a new international order in which some of the larger, more advanced states, the semi-periphery, those with an already established productive base, play a key role’ (1999: 6). It is suggested that such a reconfiguration in the developing world (however uneven this may be in practice) is spearheaded by elites in dominant states, who attempt to push for greater integration and stronger regional networks along clearly defined lines by which their position in the global political economy may be emboldened. This is particularly so as the regionalist project that is promoted invariably fits with the ‘requirements’ of international capital: liberalisation, deregulation, an emasculation of labour and ‘good governance’.
