ABSTRACT
The more impressive history regarding international hydro-politics is that of cooperation in the form of international water agreements (see Regional governance). This is not to suggest that the past is devoid of instances of non-violent conflict over water. Examples abound of political disputes from Europe (e.g. Rhine Basin) to Asia (e.g. Indus Basin)
over pollution and unilateral dam projects, respectively. Nor does the impressive record of agreements suggest that cooperation has been without incident or perhaps even taken other forms, less formalized or conventional. Scholars have pointed to inequity and strategic maneuvering enabled by power differentials (Zeitoun and Warner 2006) while other researchers have highlighted alternative forms of coordination and water governance such as networks of professionals, social movements, and international legal principles (Conca 2005). Still, the sheer number of inter-state agreements (more than 400 since 1820) is impressive and the cooperation these treaties engender (governing issues such as flood control and hydroelectric production) is noteworthy, suggesting that the characteristics that explain conflict over water may also explain inter-state cooperation. In this context, studies (e.g. Dinar 2008) have considered incentives to cooperation, oftentimes stipulated in the agreement, including issue-linkage and side-payments (see Services and Polluter pays principle).
