ABSTRACT
Investigating the two assumptions underlying Wasserman-Schultz’s statement requires an understanding of the concept of group identification. Group identification, the importance of one’s group to one’s self-concept (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; McCoy & Major, 2003; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), has long been of interest to scholars studying the experiences of members of devalued social groups. It has been investigated in many roles, including as a lens for detecting discrimination (Major, Quinton, & Schmader, 2003; Operario & Fiske, 2001; Sellers & Shelton, 2003), as a source of vulnerability and resilience when faced with discrimination (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; McCoy & Major, 2003; Quinn & Chaudoir, 2009), and as a precursor to collective action aimed at remedying discrimination (Klandermans, 2002; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Across all these contexts, group identification has been conceptualized as something that exclusively shapes the internal workings of one’s mind; that is, group identification is an intrapersonal phenomenon that acts like a psychological compass guiding the individual through the social world.
