ABSTRACT
This chapter looks at some constraints which seem to operate in determining which events in consciousness either cannot or do not enter self-awareness. Neurological model excludes simple reflex systems, homeostatic systems and association learning systems from consciousness, on the grounds that they do not depend on truly flexible representational processes and are not based on cortical substrates. Animals can be deprived of their neocortex and still carry out the type of information processing fundamental to these behavioural systems. In the case of instrumental learning there is evidence of the parallel processing, in that a capacity for handling the relevant information via cognitive representational systems interferes with the simpler association processes in favour of hypothesis-based performance. The chapter considers the conversion symptoms of hysteria, though the account is intended to be relevant to all sensory and motor manifestations of the condition. It shows that stimuli of low intensity may fail to enter self-awareness, yet be processed within conscious systems.
