ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author argues that the use of two strategies, brinkmanship and backsliding, allows governments to partly reduce the political fallout that negative integration referendums create. If the outcome of a referendum is projected to be close, they can typically employ a brinkmanship strategy and commit themselves strongly to the outcome of the referendum. The strategy of brinkmanship is based on Schelling's ground-breaking work on deterrence theory. It involves governments forcefully committing themselves to the negotiation outcome in a referendum campaign, claiming to an uncertain electorate that the treaty that they have concluded is an improvement over the status quo. To understand the strategies of brinkmanship and backsliding, the author sketches the ground-breaking Romer–Rosenthal model on agenda setting and the formal work on legislative pandering. Relying on a brinkmanship strategy is nevertheless a gamble. This is why some of them need to resort to backsliding after a defeat if they are not immediately forced to resign.
