ABSTRACT
In hindsight, we tend to exaggerate what we had known in foresight. For example, after being told that “absinthe” is not a precious stone but rather a liqueur, we are likely to express inflated confidence that we knew the solution all along (Fischhoff, 1975). This effect has been termed “hindsight bias” or the “knew-it-along effect” (Fischhoff, 1975) and has been observed in numerous studies to date (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Hoffrage & Pohl, 2003). Common to all studies is that participants are in a state of uncertainty (which is necessary in order to observe the effect) usually accomplished by using rather difficult knowledge questions or uncertain events. As a result of these studies, it appears that after knowing the solution or outcome we are simply unable to access our uncontaminated foresight knowledge state (Pohl & Hell, 1996). Moreover, we are generally even unaware of the biasing process itself, that is, of how the solution might have influenced our recollection.
