The domination of vision in our knowing and thinking about the world, or ocularcentrism, has long been a topic of many critical discussions (e.g. Levin, 1993; Jonas, 1966; Brook, 2002). One of the most comprehensive analyses of these debates has been presented in Jay’s Downcast Eyes (1993), which examined the rise and fall of sight in French thought which has been as vehement in putting the Cartesian visioncentred rationality on a pedestal as in taking it down. Within organisation studies, the objectivist and disembodied understandings of reality that resulted from ocularcentric perspectives have also been attacked on many occasions (e.g. Dale, 1997, 2001; Lennie, 2000; Kavanagh, 2004). These arguments played an important part in revealing the role of the eye in producing knowledge, scientifi c methods of inquiry and creating a society of surveillance and order. Dale (1997: 95) argues that the scientist’s eye dissects in order to perform an ‘invasive investigation, fragmentation and re-organization’ of the object of study, and that this anatomising urge pervaded almost all areas of knowledge, both as a metaphor and a form of representation. Thus, the critique of ‘culture of dissection’ presents vision as an incising, objectifying, and ordering activity aimed to seize and appropriate the other.