ABSTRACT
Many psychologists, educators, and philosophers have argued that scientific reasoning is tightly interwoven with disciplinary knowledge. Others have argued that scientific reasoning and argumentation has domain-general as well as domain-specific components. In this chapter, we examine this issue from a different angle. We ask not whether general knowledge of scientific reasoning can be shown to transfer (we agree that it can), but whether it can transfer in any useful way for the real world. We argue that general knowledge of scientific reasoning (even if it exists) lacks the value of enabling people to make successful epistemic judgments about real problems in the absence of domain-specific knowledge. Assessments used to demonstrate transfer of reasoning in educational and psychological research fall significantly short of assessing performance on tasks equivalent to problem solving in the real world. Epistemic decision making ‘in the wild’ lacks the friendly constraints that enable successful transfer on assessments used in educational and psychological research. We argue that general knowledge of scientific reasoning by lay adults is inadequate to permit either direct evaluations of evidence or evaluations of which experts should be believed in cases of scientific controversy. But in cases of scientific consensus, general knowledge of scientific reasoning practices has a different value: It allows learners to come to appreciate why scientific communities that use these reasoning practices can be trusted. In addition, general knowledge of scientific reasoning can promote greater understanding of scientific issues, more productive interactions with experts, and individual and collective action.
