at the outset, with trouble in both
But Vespasian needed to do more than merely spend a good deal of his time with the soldiers. The revolt of Civilis showed that a neglected army was a danger to the Empire as well as to the Emperor. Civ~!is largely owed his success to the widespread support he found among the nominally Roman troops quartered in Germany and Gaul. These troops were mostly natives of the region, recruited on the spot and sympathetic with the nationalist aspirations of the rebels. This was particularly true of the auxiliaries ; but the system of fixed legionary camps made it also true in large measure of the legionaries as well. They, no less than the auxiliaries, had been recruited in the vicinity, and they too joined CiYilis. Once the revolt was suppressed, Vespasian took measures to prevent its repetition. He made the auxilia serve in areas far from their countries of origin. Moreover their units were probably no longer homogeneous but composed of troops coming from widely separated localities. Nor were they any longer allowed to serve under native officers. Thus the danger of another sepoy rebellion was obviated, and in fact the auxilia were never again guilty of nationalist ambitions.