What is the significance of this new policy – if, mentioned in Table 5. The addition of any other indeed, such general statements add up to a regional countries would raise the total by some policy at all? Is it merely the latest in a long line nine million (Mozambique), over six million of futile South African overtures to Black (Angola) or about five million (Zambia). It Africa? Is it, rather, an angry reflex action pro-seems highly unlikely, however, that Pretoria voked by the collapsed Namibian negotiations? consulted any of the proposed member states Or is it, as some suspect,62 an elaborate bluff about joining a constellation. Apart from aimed at extracting better terms in the next Namibia, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and perhaps round on Namibia? The answer seems to be Malawi, the others have been making strenuous-that it is an amalgam of all these, plus some efforts to reduce their economic dependence on dangerous new factors. But official statements South Africa. They all reject apartheid and have contain a number of disparate elements; to refused to recognize the Bantustans as inde-assess the policy, the ‘soft’ elements must be pendent countries. Hence the notion of their separated from the ‘hard’. forming a closer association with South Africa First, neutrality is not a serious option for and the Bantustans, and particularly the idea of South Africa. She depends on the West for their relinquishing sovereignty to ‘international capital, technology, manpower and fuel. No secretariats’ in which Pretoria would have the Communist state would believe a South dominant voice, flies in the face of what these African declaration of neutrality, let alone adopt states have been trying to achieve – some for the a less hostile policy towards Pretoria because of past 15 years. it. The white minority’s best hope for survival – Indeed, both Botswana and Lesotho have as its leaders have always acknowledged in more already rejected this latest South African vision reflective moments – is to win Western support, of their future.63 And in July 1979 the Front whether in the form of secret arms deliveries or Line states led by Botswana, initiated their own restraint in imposing punitive economic mea-long-term plan for a regional transport and com-sures. Threats to remain neutral thus appear munication network to reduce their dependence no more than an angry gesture of defiance – a on South Africa.64 Other countries in the area way of demonstrating to the electorate that its will be invited to join. South Africa may, of leaders have been tough and uncompromising course, be anticipating that these states will face in the Namibian negotiations, even though they deepening economic problems which might drive have failed to gain their objective. them into closer political and economic asso-ciation with Pretoria. (There is undoubtedly Table 5: Possible Southern African ‘Constellation’ weakness in certain of these states, as Zambia’s re-opening of her Rhodesian rail links demon-Population

DOI link for What is the significance of this new policy – if, mentioned in Table 5. The addition of any other indeed, such general statements add up to a regional countries would raise the total by some policy at all? Is it merely the latest in a long line nine million (Mozambique), over six million of futile South African overtures to Black (Angola) or about five million (Zambia). It Africa? Is it, rather, an angry reflex action pro-seems highly unlikely, however, that Pretoria voked by the collapsed Namibian negotiations? consulted any of the proposed member states Or is it, as some suspect,62 an elaborate bluff about joining a constellation. Apart from aimed at extracting better terms in the next Namibia, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and perhaps round on Namibia? The answer seems to be Malawi, the others have been making strenuous-that it is an amalgam of all these, plus some efforts to reduce their economic dependence on dangerous new factors. But official statements South Africa. They all reject apartheid and have contain a number of disparate elements; to refused to recognize the Bantustans as inde-assess the policy, the ‘soft’ elements must be pendent countries. Hence the notion of their separated from the ‘hard’. forming a closer association with South Africa First, neutrality is not a serious option for and the Bantustans, and particularly the idea of South Africa. She depends on the West for their relinquishing sovereignty to ‘international capital, technology, manpower and fuel. No secretariats’ in which Pretoria would have the Communist state would believe a South dominant voice, flies in the face of what these African declaration of neutrality, let alone adopt states have been trying to achieve – some for the a less hostile policy towards Pretoria because of past 15 years. it. The white minority’s best hope for survival – Indeed, both Botswana and Lesotho have as its leaders have always acknowledged in more already rejected this latest South African vision reflective moments – is to win Western support, of their future.63 And in July 1979 the Front whether in the form of secret arms deliveries or Line states led by Botswana, initiated their own restraint in imposing punitive economic mea-long-term plan for a regional transport and com-sures. Threats to remain neutral thus appear munication network to reduce their dependence no more than an angry gesture of defiance – a on South Africa.64 Other countries in the area way of demonstrating to the electorate that its will be invited to join. South Africa may, of leaders have been tough and uncompromising course, be anticipating that these states will face in the Namibian negotiations, even though they deepening economic problems which might drive have failed to gain their objective. them into closer political and economic asso-ciation with Pretoria. (There is undoubtedly Table 5: Possible Southern African ‘Constellation’ weakness in certain of these states, as Zambia’s re-opening of her Rhodesian rail links demon-Population

What is the significance of this new policy – if, mentioned in Table 5. The addition of any other indeed, such general statements add up to a regional countries would raise the total by some policy at all? Is it merely the latest in a long line nine million (Mozambique), over six million of futile South African overtures to Black (Angola) or about five million (Zambia). It Africa? Is it, rather, an angry reflex action pro-seems highly unlikely, however, that Pretoria voked by the collapsed Namibian negotiations? consulted any of the proposed member states Or is it, as some suspect,62 an elaborate bluff about joining a constellation. Apart from aimed at extracting better terms in the next Namibia, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and perhaps round on Namibia? The answer seems to be Malawi, the others have been making strenuous-that it is an amalgam of all these, plus some efforts to reduce their economic dependence on dangerous new factors. But official statements South Africa. They all reject apartheid and have contain a number of disparate elements; to refused to recognize the Bantustans as inde-assess the policy, the ‘soft’ elements must be pendent countries. Hence the notion of their separated from the ‘hard’. forming a closer association with South Africa First, neutrality is not a serious option for and the Bantustans, and particularly the idea of South Africa. She depends on the West for their relinquishing sovereignty to ‘international capital, technology, manpower and fuel. No secretariats’ in which Pretoria would have the Communist state would believe a South dominant voice, flies in the face of what these African declaration of neutrality, let alone adopt states have been trying to achieve – some for the a less hostile policy towards Pretoria because of past 15 years. it. The white minority’s best hope for survival – Indeed, both Botswana and Lesotho have as its leaders have always acknowledged in more already rejected this latest South African vision reflective moments – is to win Western support, of their future.63 And in July 1979 the Front whether in the form of secret arms deliveries or Line states led by Botswana, initiated their own restraint in imposing punitive economic mea-long-term plan for a regional transport and com-sures. Threats to remain neutral thus appear munication network to reduce their dependence no more than an angry gesture of defiance – a on South Africa.64 Other countries in the area way of demonstrating to the electorate that its will be invited to join. South Africa may, of leaders have been tough and uncompromising course, be anticipating that these states will face in the Namibian negotiations, even though they deepening economic problems which might drive have failed to gain their objective. them into closer political and economic asso-ciation with Pretoria. (There is undoubtedly Table 5: Possible Southern African ‘Constellation’ weakness in certain of these states, as Zambia’s re-opening of her Rhodesian rail links demon-Population