For what remains of the policy, once the ‘soft’, offered the best hope for stability; hence South rhetorical parts have been excised, is a tough Africa appeared ready to intervene with military plan for tightening the laager‚ but a laager re- and economic support, if needed. But South drawn to include Namibia and Zimbabwe- Africa was not committed to any one Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Some of this was implicit in the leader. Her chief interest lay in a stable Rhodesia. Foreign Minister’s talk of establishing ‘sub- As Mr Botha told Parliament, ‘If confusion and continental solidarity’. In November 1978, chaos are created for Rhodesia by outside forces, within a month of becoming Prime Minister, I want to warn that the South African parliament Mr Botha told Parliament of the need for the will have to consider what steps we are going to ‘free nations’ of the region to plan a joint take because we do not want and cannot afford strategy based on their resistance to Russian confusion on our borders’.71 Dismayed by imperialism and militarism.65 This revival of the Mugabe’s election victory, which dashed all regional security idea was made more explicit in hope of including Zimbabwe in Mr Botha’s the White Paper in which Mr Botha des-regional security scheme, Pretoria again warned cribed his Government’s vision for southern that upheaval in Zimbabwe – leading to a flight Africa, including ‘the concept of mutual defence of refugees into South Africa or attacks from against a common enemy’ – the latter defined as Zimbabwe – would meet the ‘full force’ of its the expansion of Marxist influence.66 might. Concrete policy moves since early 1979 seem Clearly events in Namibia were the other consistent with the idea of this extended South major factor in the ‘Fortress Southern Africa’ African defence perimeter. In Rhodesia Pretoria initiative. As discussed above, the Government had been giving heavy backing to the Muzorewa was distressed at the turn taken by the negotia-regime. The Botha Government provided finan-tions in the winter of 1978–79. Time was not on cial aid, trucks, bullhorns and other logistical South Africa’s side: the longer the talks dragged help during the Rhodesian elections in April on, the greater were the chances of general and (most important) a consignment of political disorder and declining morale among

DOI link for For what remains of the policy, once the ‘soft’, offered the best hope for stability; hence South rhetorical parts have been excised, is a tough Africa appeared ready to intervene with military plan for tightening the laager‚ but a laager re- and economic support, if needed. But South drawn to include Namibia and Zimbabwe- Africa was not committed to any one Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Some of this was implicit in the leader. Her chief interest lay in a stable Rhodesia. Foreign Minister’s talk of establishing ‘sub- As Mr Botha told Parliament, ‘If confusion and continental solidarity’. In November 1978, chaos are created for Rhodesia by outside forces, within a month of becoming Prime Minister, I want to warn that the South African parliament Mr Botha told Parliament of the need for the will have to consider what steps we are going to ‘free nations’ of the region to plan a joint take because we do not want and cannot afford strategy based on their resistance to Russian confusion on our borders’.71 Dismayed by imperialism and militarism.65 This revival of the Mugabe’s election victory, which dashed all regional security idea was made more explicit in hope of including Zimbabwe in Mr Botha’s the White Paper in which Mr Botha des-regional security scheme, Pretoria again warned cribed his Government’s vision for southern that upheaval in Zimbabwe – leading to a flight Africa, including ‘the concept of mutual defence of refugees into South Africa or attacks from against a common enemy’ – the latter defined as Zimbabwe – would meet the ‘full force’ of its the expansion of Marxist influence.66 might. Concrete policy moves since early 1979 seem Clearly events in Namibia were the other consistent with the idea of this extended South major factor in the ‘Fortress Southern Africa’ African defence perimeter. In Rhodesia Pretoria initiative. As discussed above, the Government had been giving heavy backing to the Muzorewa was distressed at the turn taken by the negotia-regime. The Botha Government provided finan-tions in the winter of 1978–79. Time was not on cial aid, trucks, bullhorns and other logistical South Africa’s side: the longer the talks dragged help during the Rhodesian elections in April on, the greater were the chances of general and (most important) a consignment of political disorder and declining morale among

For what remains of the policy, once the ‘soft’, offered the best hope for stability; hence South rhetorical parts have been excised, is a tough Africa appeared ready to intervene with military plan for tightening the laager‚ but a laager re- and economic support, if needed. But South drawn to include Namibia and Zimbabwe- Africa was not committed to any one Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Some of this was implicit in the leader. Her chief interest lay in a stable Rhodesia. Foreign Minister’s talk of establishing ‘sub- As Mr Botha told Parliament, ‘If confusion and continental solidarity’. In November 1978, chaos are created for Rhodesia by outside forces, within a month of becoming Prime Minister, I want to warn that the South African parliament Mr Botha told Parliament of the need for the will have to consider what steps we are going to ‘free nations’ of the region to plan a joint take because we do not want and cannot afford strategy based on their resistance to Russian confusion on our borders’.71 Dismayed by imperialism and militarism.65 This revival of the Mugabe’s election victory, which dashed all regional security idea was made more explicit in hope of including Zimbabwe in Mr Botha’s the White Paper in which Mr Botha des-regional security scheme, Pretoria again warned cribed his Government’s vision for southern that upheaval in Zimbabwe – leading to a flight Africa, including ‘the concept of mutual defence of refugees into South Africa or attacks from against a common enemy’ – the latter defined as Zimbabwe – would meet the ‘full force’ of its the expansion of Marxist influence.66 might. Concrete policy moves since early 1979 seem Clearly events in Namibia were the other consistent with the idea of this extended South major factor in the ‘Fortress Southern Africa’ African defence perimeter. In Rhodesia Pretoria initiative. As discussed above, the Government had been giving heavy backing to the Muzorewa was distressed at the turn taken by the negotia-regime. The Botha Government provided finan-tions in the winter of 1978–79. Time was not on cial aid, trucks, bullhorns and other logistical South Africa’s side: the longer the talks dragged help during the Rhodesian elections in April on, the greater were the chances of general and (most important) a consignment of political disorder and declining morale among