South Africa has also kept a tight hold on and to help each territory to achieve moderate executive power in Namibia. Differences have and stable government, protected by South emerged between Pretoria and Windhoek on Africa and (if possible) recognized internation-this issue. In December the South African ally. Beyond these objectives, the leadership in Administrator-General for the territory stated Pretoria must hope that its future suzerainty over that the newly elected Namibian Constituent these areas, once established and acknowledged, Assembly would decide whether or not to hold would enhance South Africa’s status as an a second election under UN auspices.74 A few important regional power, thus assuring her days later Prime Minister Botha corrected this leadership of a more sympathetic reception notion, saying that the Assembly ‘had been in its dealings with the UN and the West. advised to accept’ such an election and that But the ‘fortress’ initiative is two-pronged: its the internal aspect is at least as important as the final decision would be South Africa’s, ‘in consultation’ with the Assembly.75 external. While adopting a hard line towards the Pretoria’s insistence on retaining executive outside world and extending South Africa’s power, while the internal process moves forward, defence laager to encompass Zimbabwe-may be based more on internal Namibian Rhodesia and Namibia, Mr. Botha has also been politics than on concern about reactions in the moving to enlarge the domestic laager to take in and the West. South Africa wants the internal South Africa’s coloureds and Asians and, administration to be strong enough to with-ultimately, an urban black élite. His rationale is stand future pressure from SWAPOand the UN clear: military power alone cannot guarantee the

DOI link for South Africa has also kept a tight hold on and to help each territory to achieve moderate executive power in Namibia. Differences have and stable government, protected by South emerged between Pretoria and Windhoek on Africa and (if possible) recognized internation-this issue. In December the South African ally. Beyond these objectives, the leadership in Administrator-General for the territory stated Pretoria must hope that its future suzerainty over that the newly elected Namibian Constituent these areas, once established and acknowledged, Assembly would decide whether or not to hold would enhance South Africa’s status as an a second election under UN auspices.74 A few important regional power, thus assuring her days later Prime Minister Botha corrected this leadership of a more sympathetic reception notion, saying that the Assembly ‘had been in its dealings with the UN and the West. advised to accept’ such an election and that But the ‘fortress’ initiative is two-pronged: its the internal aspect is at least as important as the final decision would be South Africa’s, ‘in consultation’ with the Assembly.75 external. While adopting a hard line towards the Pretoria’s insistence on retaining executive outside world and extending South Africa’s power, while the internal process moves forward, defence laager to encompass Zimbabwe-may be based more on internal Namibian Rhodesia and Namibia, Mr. Botha has also been politics than on concern about reactions in the moving to enlarge the domestic laager to take in and the West. South Africa wants the internal South Africa’s coloureds and Asians and, administration to be strong enough to with-ultimately, an urban black élite. His rationale is stand future pressure from SWAPOand the UN clear: military power alone cannot guarantee the

South Africa has also kept a tight hold on and to help each territory to achieve moderate executive power in Namibia. Differences have and stable government, protected by South emerged between Pretoria and Windhoek on Africa and (if possible) recognized internation-this issue. In December the South African ally. Beyond these objectives, the leadership in Administrator-General for the territory stated Pretoria must hope that its future suzerainty over that the newly elected Namibian Constituent these areas, once established and acknowledged, Assembly would decide whether or not to hold would enhance South Africa’s status as an a second election under UN auspices.74 A few important regional power, thus assuring her days later Prime Minister Botha corrected this leadership of a more sympathetic reception notion, saying that the Assembly ‘had been in its dealings with the UN and the West. advised to accept’ such an election and that But the ‘fortress’ initiative is two-pronged: its the internal aspect is at least as important as the final decision would be South Africa’s, ‘in consultation’ with the Assembly.75 external. While adopting a hard line towards the Pretoria’s insistence on retaining executive outside world and extending South Africa’s power, while the internal process moves forward, defence laager to encompass Zimbabwe-may be based more on internal Namibian Rhodesia and Namibia, Mr. Botha has also been politics than on concern about reactions in the moving to enlarge the domestic laager to take in and the West. South Africa wants the internal South Africa’s coloureds and Asians and, administration to be strong enough to with-ultimately, an urban black élite. His rationale is stand future pressure from SWAPOand the UN clear: military power alone cannot guarantee the