clandestine relations abroad. In some cases The Verwoerd and Vorster Administrations sympathetic governments have turned a blind believed that South Africa’s growing economic eye to illegal South African dealings with local power could be used effectively, both as a club arms manufacturers. In their relations with two and as a magnet, to gain influence in Africa. or three fellow ‘pariah’ states (Israel in parti-Mr Botha’s Administration appears to share cular) South African military and commercial this conviction. South African loans and representatives have established close, informal technical aid have so far had only limited and working ties of invaluable importance to South temporary success in attracting friendship and Africa’s security over the years. support (and thereby dampening African opposi-Of the several internal constraints on security tion to apartheid), even among its three virtual policy, the chronic shortage of skilled white dependencies, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. manpower is almost certain to remain the most The threat of economic retaliation by Pretoria serious. Because of manpower limitations, undoubtedly carries weight with Presidents the Minister of Defence has been unable to Kaunda and Machel, but not nearly as much create the additional PF brigade which he as the danger of pre-emptive or punitive strikes believes would be the most effective means of by the SADF

DOI link for clandestine relations abroad. In some cases The Verwoerd and Vorster Administrations sympathetic governments have turned a blind believed that South Africa’s growing economic eye to illegal South African dealings with local power could be used effectively, both as a club arms manufacturers. In their relations with two and as a magnet, to gain influence in Africa. or three fellow ‘pariah’ states (Israel in parti-Mr Botha’s Administration appears to share cular) South African military and commercial this conviction. South African loans and representatives have established close, informal technical aid have so far had only limited and working ties of invaluable importance to South temporary success in attracting friendship and Africa’s security over the years. support (and thereby dampening African opposi-Of the several internal constraints on security tion to apartheid), even among its three virtual policy, the chronic shortage of skilled white dependencies, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. manpower is almost certain to remain the most The threat of economic retaliation by Pretoria serious. Because of manpower limitations, undoubtedly carries weight with Presidents the Minister of Defence has been unable to Kaunda and Machel, but not nearly as much create the additional PF brigade which he as the danger of pre-emptive or punitive strikes believes would be the most effective means of by the SADF

clandestine relations abroad. In some cases The Verwoerd and Vorster Administrations sympathetic governments have turned a blind believed that South Africa’s growing economic eye to illegal South African dealings with local power could be used effectively, both as a club arms manufacturers. In their relations with two and as a magnet, to gain influence in Africa. or three fellow ‘pariah’ states (Israel in parti-Mr Botha’s Administration appears to share cular) South African military and commercial this conviction. South African loans and representatives have established close, informal technical aid have so far had only limited and working ties of invaluable importance to South temporary success in attracting friendship and Africa’s security over the years. support (and thereby dampening African opposi-Of the several internal constraints on security tion to apartheid), even among its three virtual policy, the chronic shortage of skilled white dependencies, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. manpower is almost certain to remain the most The threat of economic retaliation by Pretoria serious. Because of manpower limitations, undoubtedly carries weight with Presidents the Minister of Defence has been unable to Kaunda and Machel, but not nearly as much create the additional PF brigade which he as the danger of pre-emptive or punitive strikes believes would be the most effective means of by the SADF