South Africa’s leaders, however, may be less concern to the leaders than their success marching to a different set of priorities. If, as or failure to gain widespread acquiescence American experts believe,16 the Kalahari location among domestic non-whites and to quell was a planned test site, this would mean either internal unrest. that the South African leaders were prepared A second general proposition is that any to defy the world in an extremely blatant and South African Administration must give the provocative way, or that they believed a test appearance of toughness and of being in would go undetected. In either case the incentive control if it is to retain the confidence and sup-to test a weapon would have persisted, and the port of the beleaguered white community – test postponement may have been only a tempo-particularly of the Afrikaans-speakers, who rary expedient to see what concessions might make up the majority of whites. Hence any be wrung from the West following the discovery significant concessions to South Africa’s non-of the site. Thus the suspected South African whites will be accompanied by harsh measures test in September 1979 signified perhaps that against internal dissidents and a belligerent Pretoria had decided that the chances of Western posture toward external opponents. Similarly, nuclear co-operation were slim and that South a sharp South African military initiative is Africa should proceed to test – though still likely to follow any substantial concessions hoping to be able to make a plausible denial. by Pretoria in the negotiations over Namibia. In view of the risks and limitations associated Moreover, the leadership’s perception of its with each of the alternative strategies discussed, negotiations with the West over the past few what course is South Africa likely to follow? years has reinforced the Afrikaner leaders’ And what will her basic security strategy look built-in historical sense that concessions to like in the s? opponents are both futile and dangerous.

DOI link for South Africa’s leaders, however, may be less concern to the leaders than their success marching to a different set of priorities. If, as or failure to gain widespread acquiescence American experts believe,16 the Kalahari location among domestic non-whites and to quell was a planned test site, this would mean either internal unrest. that the South African leaders were prepared A second general proposition is that any to defy the world in an extremely blatant and South African Administration must give the provocative way, or that they believed a test appearance of toughness and of being in would go undetected. In either case the incentive control if it is to retain the confidence and sup-to test a weapon would have persisted, and the port of the beleaguered white community – test postponement may have been only a tempo-particularly of the Afrikaans-speakers, who rary expedient to see what concessions might make up the majority of whites. Hence any be wrung from the West following the discovery significant concessions to South Africa’s non-of the site. Thus the suspected South African whites will be accompanied by harsh measures test in September 1979 signified perhaps that against internal dissidents and a belligerent Pretoria had decided that the chances of Western posture toward external opponents. Similarly, nuclear co-operation were slim and that South a sharp South African military initiative is Africa should proceed to test – though still likely to follow any substantial concessions hoping to be able to make a plausible denial. by Pretoria in the negotiations over Namibia. In view of the risks and limitations associated Moreover, the leadership’s perception of its with each of the alternative strategies discussed, negotiations with the West over the past few what course is South Africa likely to follow? years has reinforced the Afrikaner leaders’ And what will her basic security strategy look built-in historical sense that concessions to like in the s? opponents are both futile and dangerous.

South Africa’s leaders, however, may be less concern to the leaders than their success marching to a different set of priorities. If, as or failure to gain widespread acquiescence American experts believe,16 the Kalahari location among domestic non-whites and to quell was a planned test site, this would mean either internal unrest. that the South African leaders were prepared A second general proposition is that any to defy the world in an extremely blatant and South African Administration must give the provocative way, or that they believed a test appearance of toughness and of being in would go undetected. In either case the incentive control if it is to retain the confidence and sup-to test a weapon would have persisted, and the port of the beleaguered white community – test postponement may have been only a tempo-particularly of the Afrikaans-speakers, who rary expedient to see what concessions might make up the majority of whites. Hence any be wrung from the West following the discovery significant concessions to South Africa’s non-of the site. Thus the suspected South African whites will be accompanied by harsh measures test in September 1979 signified perhaps that against internal dissidents and a belligerent Pretoria had decided that the chances of Western posture toward external opponents. Similarly, nuclear co-operation were slim and that South a sharp South African military initiative is Africa should proceed to test – though still likely to follow any substantial concessions hoping to be able to make a plausible denial. by Pretoria in the negotiations over Namibia. In view of the risks and limitations associated Moreover, the leadership’s perception of its with each of the alternative strategies discussed, negotiations with the West over the past few what course is South Africa likely to follow? years has reinforced the Afrikaner leaders’ And what will her basic security strategy look built-in historical sense that concessions to like in the s? opponents are both futile and dangerous.