ABSTRACT
To what extent are the choices we make truly free? At least at fi rst glance, there is a problem squaring the existence of human free will with the fact that we have (or we are ) physical bodies that are subject to the laws of biology, chemistry, and physics. Perhaps freedom is just an illusion. Perhaps the trajectory of my life is just as predictable and unalterable as the trajectory of a stone that has been hurled through the air-outside forces such as gravity and air resistance will affect its fl ight path, but there is nothing that it can do to change its movement. What is the relationship between determinism and freedom of the will? If determinism is true, does that imply that none of my “choices” are free? If so, what does that say about moral responsibility? How can I be held morally (or legally) responsible for actions that I could not possibly avoid doing? Maybe determinism is false. Maybe at least some of my decisions could have turned out otherwise. Is that what is meant by “freedom of the will”? This topic is broken up as follows. Section 5.1 will examine what scientists and philosophers mean by the word “determinism.” After a brief overview of the two focus fi lms, we move on to look at the relationship among determinism, freedom of the will, and moral responsibility, using Minority Report and Memento as a source of ideas and illustrations.
