ABSTRACT
Much of the recent research on moral judgment in the social and cognitive sciences focuses on subjects’ responses to vignettes that impose a forced choice (e.g., approve–disapprove, appropriate–inappropriate) on them or that present them with highly unusual or disgusting scenarios—for example, various versions of the trolley problem or sex with animals. No doubt many useful things can be learned from such studies—such as the ways moral opinions covary with socioeconomic status. However, it is not clear that they shed as much light as is claimed on the cognitive processes involved in moral reasoning, in part because they do not, and perhaps cannot, take account of the cross-temporal aspects of moral reasoning in everyday life. The moral verdicts subjects give in response to these vignettes are not decisions they must live with and for which they are accountable. Our moral choices have histories as well as consequences, and many of the most important moral decisions we make are not the work of a moment. I explore some representative cases of moral reasoning and revision across time and consider the implications for meta-ethics and conceptions of moral agency.
