ABSTRACT
T he question of what role emotions play in moral deliberation, judgment, and action has been a central concern of philosophical moral psychology since Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. In Aristotle’s view, virtuous action is not just a matter of doing the right thing at the right time and in the right manner. It also involves correct perception: being able to discern the morally salient features of the eliciting situation and to respond appropriately (see, e.g., Aristotle, Trans., 1984). This involves both rational and emotional capacities: knowing what principles are relevant to the situation and how they should be applied but also having emotional responses that are appropriate to the situation-feeling anger or compassion or regret when the situation merits such responses. Hume also thought that virtue requires correct perception of the morally salient features of the eliciting situation (see, e.g., Hume, 1739/1978, Book III). For Hume correct moral perception arises from the passions, or sentiments, but not from hot passions; rather, it requires adopting the point of view of what he refers to as the calm passions or the corrected sentiments. Hume compares the corrected, moral sentiments to corrective judgments in sense perception; because we know that sense perception is not always veridical, in our judgments we learn to correct for common sensory illusions. Similarly, the moral sentiments are passions or emotions that have been corrected by reflection. Thus, although Aristotle and Hume recognized that emotions play a key role in alerting us to relevant reason-giving considerations, they were well aware that emotions can also distort moral perception, deliberation, and judgment. This is why, for both, moral agency requires that we reflect on and regulate our emotional responses.
