ABSTRACT

Ukraine holds a pivotal geostrategic position in Europe-western Asia. It sits on the crossroads between central and eastern Europe and central Eurasia, with a land area larger than Germany and the United Kingdom combined (and a population of 55 million). It is a major transit route for hydrocarbons, holding the key to co-operation (and conflict) between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/European powers and Russia. For example, the European Union (EU) is dependent on the Odessa-Brodi oil pipeline, which handles petroleum supplies from the Caucasus and the Middle East to Europe. Also, gas pipelines passing through Ukraine provide Europe with Russian gas. With the accession of Poland and Hungary to both NATO and the EU, Ukraine currently shares with the West a common border of over 650 km. Western Ukraine (Ternopil, IvanoFrankivsk, Rivne, Volyn and Lviv) is predominately Roman Catholic and ethnically-linguistically Ukrainian. Eastern Ukraine is predominately Eastern Orthodox and the spoken language is Russian. Owing to its historical legacy (over the last 300 years Ukraine has been part of various empires) and the involvement of the great powers in its domestic environment, Ukraine’s population and political elites do not have a common pattern of orientation, political behaviour and economic profiles. Instability and conflict have been visible and endemic, particularly after the collapse of Soviet communism, thus impacting upon Europe’s own peace and stability. Two blocs seem to be competing over influence in Ukraine today: NATO and the Euro-Atlantic area, on the one hand, and Russia on the other. This, however, needs qualification. The EU and NATO do not pursue identical diplomacy towards Ukraine. For reasons that have to do with the EU’s weakness in the fields of common foreign, security and defence policies, NATO and the USA dominate policies towards Ukraine in the overall Euro-Atlantic strategic orbit, while Russia at least as much is trying to dominate Ukraine’s political landscape. This conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine is projected directly into the polity structures of Ukraine. For example, in 2000-01, President Leonid Kuchma dismissed the pro-NATO Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Borys Tarasiuk, and also forced out of office the liberal pro-Western Prime Minister, Viktor Yushchenko. Kuchma’s moves were accompanied by a number of other pro-Russian initiatives, such as conclusion of bilateral trade

agreements on energy and military collaboration, as well as in the aviation and shipbuilding sectors. There is, therefore, a pronounced conflict between the USled West and Russia over Ukraine’s political orientation, a conflict that unfolded in earnest during the so-called Orange Revolution of 2004. Yushchenko, supported by the West, drew support from western areas of Ukraine, whereas Viktor Yanukovich had his constituency in eastern Ukraine and was backed by Russia. The presidential election of October 2004 became the source of conflict between Yushchenko and Yanukovich, when the former accused the latter of massive fraud. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians demonstrated against the result in what came to be known as the Orange Revolution, after Yushchenko’s chosen campaign colour. There is clear evidence that both Moscow andWashington, DC, have been interfering in Ukrainian politics since the end of the USSR. Both Russia and the West interfered in the 2004 election and, as most recent events have demonstrated, Russian influence remains very solid in Ukraine, to the degree that any attempt by the USA (or its agencies) or NATO to remove that influence could potentially destabilize the entire Black Sea and east-central European region.