ABSTRACT

With the advent of Islam in Kashmir in the fourteenth century and due to its geographical proximity with Central Asia, there followed a strong cultural intercourse between Kashmir and Islamic centres of learning particularly Bukhara, Samarkand, Herat, Meshed, Khurasan and Baghdad. Islamic mysticism, which was introduced into Kashmir by Muslim Syeds and Sufis from Central Asia and Persia, came in contact with the indigenous Rishis and mystics. This interaction, in turn, led to the formation of Rishi thought in Kashmir, which believed in oneness of man and love of human beings and abhorred violence, laying stress on spiritual salvation rather than proselytisation. Thus came into being a common cultural tradition and literature which rejected communalism and promoted peace and harmony. It was due to this Rishi orientation of the Kashmiri psyche and the liberal

and secular ethos of Kashmiri Muslims, that “two nation theory” and communal politics of M. A. Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, did not find any acceptance in Kashmir during and after the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. So much so, that the Pakistani tribal raiders were resisted and hated during their attack on the Valley in 1947 by the Kashmiri Muslim masses, who raised the slogan Hamlavar Khabardar, hum Kashmiri hain tayar (Beware the raiders, we Kashmiris are ready to fight). Kashmiris demonstrated similar apathy to the Pakistani intruders during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, when Pakistan sent its armed infiltrations in the Valley under the plan codenamed “Operation Gibralter” to capture Kashmir. Kashmiri Muslims virtually handed over the Pakistani infiltrators to security forces, bringing to naught the Pakistani nefarious design. The 1971 Indo-Pakistan war and the consequent independence of Bangladesh, proved to be a turning point in Kashmir politics. Kashmiri Muslims witnessed the division of Pakistan into two nations and the abject failure of “two nation theory”. The dissident antiIndia groups in Kashmir including the Plebiscite Front realizing the ground reality, now began negotiations with the Government of India to find a solution to the Kashmir problem. This resulted in the February 1975 accord between Sheikh Abdullah and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Thus began a new chapter in Kashmir with Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference assuming power in the State. Sheikh Abdullah and other Kashmiri

leaders declared that the creation of Bangladesh had vindicated the decision of National Conference to reject Jinnah’s “two nation theory” and go for the accession of Kashmir to Indian Union in 1947. The majority of Kashmiri Muslims saw reason in this argument and there ensued an atmosphere of general peace, tranquillity and social and economic development in Kashmir. But the communalized section of Kashmiri Muslim society and some political groups particularly the Jamaat-e-Islami and its front organizations though remaining dormant for quite some time, now revised their strategies. And these groups found an opportunity in the political vacuum created in the Valley following the death of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. Notwithstanding the accession of Kashmir to a secular and democratic

India, theMullah (clergy) class in Kashmir was attracted towards the theocratic Pakistan. Traditionally, the clergy has been opposed to liberalism, democracy and modernization. Before 1947, Mullahism in Kashmir was symbolized by the institution of Qazi (administrator of justice), Mufti (responsible for issuing fatwa) and Maulavi (priest). Besides, there was the institution of Mirwaiz in Kashmir. Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah (grandfather of the current Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, who is also leader of the secessionist group All Parties Hurriyat Conference), headed the Muslim Conference and migrated to Pakistan soon after 1947, as he was a vehement opponent of the popular party National Conference and its leader Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. After 1947, such Mullahism and its functionaries virtually became powerless and redundant in the new political and socio-economic order. This section of Kashmiri Muslim society which believed in religious identity, found its model in the neighbouring Islamic State of Pakistan. Whereas Sheikh Abdullah and his party ensured that Kashmir acceded to India, Yusuf Shah opposed this. The partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947 led to the creation of Pakistan on the basis of two-nation theory. And Kashmir being contiguous to Pakistan besides having a predominantly Muslim population, was bound to be impacted by the thought of communal identity. Now the traditional Mullahism in Kashmir came to be subsumed and overwhelmed by the fundamentalism and fanaticism promoted by Jamaat-e-Islami, which had been following Mawdudi’s doctrine. It was during the late nineteenth century which witnessed the emergence of

an urban and educated Muslim middle class that the Kashmiri Muslims began to question the Hindu Dogra rule and assert their political interests. Maulana Rasool Shah (1855-1909), the Mirwaiz of Kashmir and the head of Jamia Masjid, Srinagar established the Anjuman Nusrat-ul-Islam (Society for the Victory of Islam) in 1899 and started “spreading Islamic education based on the Shariah” and also “creating political awareness among the Muslims”.1

Later in 1909, the Anjuman set up the Islamiya High School in Srinagar, which subsequently set up “several branches in small towns in Kashmir”.2

Whereas, Rasul Shah’s younger brother Mirwaiz Ahmadullah set up an Oriental College in Srinagar, his successor Mirwaiz Maulana Mohammad Yusuf Shah “developed the links of the Anjuman with Islamic reformist

groups in India”.3 Yusuf Shah, who returned to Kashmir in 1924 after his studies at the Dar-ul-Ulum at Deoband, “set up a branch of the Khilafat Committee to promote the cause of the Ottoman Caliphate among the Kashmiri Muslims”.4 Yusuf Shah also set up a Muslim printing press in Srinagar and started publishing two weeklies, al-Islam and Rahnuma, which campaigned against the “un-Islamic” practices of Kashmiri Muslims. Now educated Kashmiri Muslims began to have links with other Muslim groups in Aligarh, Punjab and Delhi. Such a “growing Islamic consciousness first manifested itself in the form of the Ahl-e-Hadith”, which campaigned against the un-Islamic practices and shrines, which in their view had emerged as “the chief centres of superstition and charlatanism, controlled by crafty, hypocritical and materialist mullahs”.5 But the Ahl-e-Hadith did not have any mass appeal and there were numerous instances of “violent opposition to them for their condemnation of Sufis, saints and shrines”.6 Ahl-e-Hadith even built their separate mosques in parts of Kashmir where they had a considerable following. It was the Ahl-e-Hadith that laid the ideological foundation of the future work of Jamaat-e-Islami which pursued the similar agenda of cleansing Kashmiri Muslims of their “un-Islamic” characteristics and for achieving the Islamic mission of Nizam-e-Mustafa. With the strengthening of materialistic culture, influx/generation of sub-

stantial wealth and growing economic affluence, power and authority among a wider section of Kashmiri Muslim society, particularly among the bureaucracy, business, contractor and neo-rich class and even intelligentsia, these sections of society achieved status and set the trends in new socio-economic life of Kashmir Muslims. They flaunted their wealth and status in almost every sphere of life, causing discomfiture to others who were not so affluent. The Islamic fundamentalists felt that these materialistic and extraneous influences debased the pristine teachings of Islam and led the Kashmiri Muslims to adopt un-Islamic ways of life. They believed that moral degradation and the rise of materialism among Muslims eroded the strength, appeal and influence of Islam and they called for cleansing Islam of such evil practices (called bidat). Ironically it was the middle and upper class of Kashmiri Muslims comprising the educated elite, who were exposed to the Aligarh school of thought and also to Middle Eastern society and polity – neo-rich, corrupt businessmen, politicians, bureaucrats and big estate holders – which has been the main support base of the extremists like the Jamaat-e-Islami. They doled out large donations to build mosques, madrassas and for social welfare schemes in order to cover their misdeeds and to gain legitimacy and influence in society and politics. Islamic fundamentalists devoted sufficient time and energy to carry out indoctrination through propaganda, persuasion and even intimidation. Writings on Islam, its doctrine, history, culture, society and politics started being produced and published in huge quantities, exhorting the Kashmiri Muslims to shun the un-Islamic way of life. They called for removing what they called the distortion of history. Islamic fundamentalists lay stress on fulfilling the obligations (farz) of namaz (five-times-a-day

prayer), Ramzan fastings, halal and haram (allowed and disallowed), Haj, zakat (charity), ultimate faith in the Prophethood and Quran, absoluteness of Islamic ideology, congregational prayers, inseparability of religion and politics and non-territoriality of Islam. At the same time, alcoholism, dance, music, courts, the judiciary, earning of bank interest and various things associated with a secular, democratic and liberal order, were publicly decried and declared un-Islamic. But the problem and dilemma of the Islamic society arises from the fact

that many Islamic doctrines and practices do not conform to the political and socio-economic realities of the present-day world with science, technology, modernization and globalization being order of the day. Many Muslim countries receive international loans and Muslims around the world are using banking facilities, saving their funds in bank deposits, earning interest etc. This dichotomy in belief and actual practices necessitated by the exigencies of modern times is clearly visible in Kashmir. Ignoring the Islamist calls forbidding Muslims to earn interest, Kashmiri Muslims have been making full use of the banking facilities; so much so that Jammu and Kashmir Bank now ranks among the top few banks in India, in terms of its deposits, loans and other services. And it achieved this status only after 1990, that is during and after the militancy in the Valley. Jamaat-e-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir is one of the most influential

Islamic movements in South Asia and it has played a key role in the transformation of society and politics of the Muslim majority Valley of Kashmir, from a traditional and composite culture based on reverence of indigenous religious traditions and practices including the shrines, ziarats and tombs and liberal secular political beliefs to a puritan Islamic religious and political order of an Islamic state based on the principles of Shariah. Jamaat-e-Islami was launched in 1942, when its leaders Qari Saifuddin, Saaduddin and Maulana Ghulam Ahmed Ahrar and a group of like-minded Kashmiri Muslims influenced by Mawdudi’s ideology, met together at Shopian in Kashmir. Soon after, Saaduddin and Maulana Ahrar and few other Kashmiris attended the All India Convention of Jamaat-e-Islami organized by Maulana Mawdudi in 1945 at Pathankot.7 Here it was decided that the Jamaat should organize itself in Kashmir, and Saaduddin was chosen as the Amir to lead the organization in the State, which position he held till 1985.8 In the beginning, the Jamaat in Kashmir did not get any response due to its pan-Islamic ideology which was not in tune with the Kashmiri way of Islam. Besides, the mass movement led by late Sheikh Abdullah against the feudal autocracy of the Maharaja had a sway over the people of Kashmir. During the postpartition period from 1947-53, Jamaat-e-Islami leaders remained content with propagating their pan-Islamic ideology, which, however, did not strike an immediate chord with the common Kashmiri, who was beginning to reap immense benefits from the revolutionary agrarian reforms, abolition of debt and mortgages introduced by the ruling National Conference led by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. However, Jamaat-e-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir

maintained its independent political posture from the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind while retaining fraternal and ideological links with it. But it has been close to the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan and followed its agenda. The State witnessed political upheaval in 1953, when Sheikh Abdullah was

arrested and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad assumed power in Jammu and Kashmir. To quell political turmoil in the Valley, Bakshi had used political and religious groups to gain popularity in the State and to overcome people’s displeasure over the Sheikh’s arrest. This provided an opportunity to the Jamaat-e-Islami, J & K to start building its cadres in villages and towns through madrassas and schools. In the subsequent years, the Jamaat-e-Islami network of madrassas increased along with the number of students and followers. These madrassas acted as centres of propagating Jamaat-e-Islami ideology in the Valley among the Muslim population, particularly the youth. Successive State governments did not take any steps to restrain the spread of Jamaat-e-Islami ideology among the youth. The Jamaat-e-Islami elements made steady inroads in almost all departments of the State administration, particularly education, revenue and public works. For the expansion of its cadres and ideology in the Valley, Jamaat-e-Islami leaders used mosques as the basic units in villages and towns. Since it is obligatory for every Muslim to take part in the collective prayers on Friday, Jamaat-e-Islami asked some of its vocal leaders well versed in Islamic theology to visit townships and villages to address the Friday congregations to propagate Islam and Islamic duties according to the Quran and Hadith. Until the year 1970-71, Jamaat-e-Islami, J & K did not have any share in

the political spectrum of the State. It used the medium of spreading its ideology to grassroots in the farthest villages of the Valley and Muslim pockets in other regions to create a political vote bank in its areas of influence. Soon after Syed Mir Qasim became the Chief Minister, Jamaat-e-Islami, J&K was recognized as a political party enabling it to fight State Assembly elections in 1972. Many of the then Congress leaders of the State had opposed the idea of giving recognition to an organization like Jamaat-e-Islami in the State as the organization was communal. In the 1972 Assembly elections, Jamaat-e-Islami contested 20 seats in Kashmir and two seats in Jammu, but won five in the Valley and none in Jammu. Jamaat-e-Islami protested against the Sheikh Abdullah-Indira Gandhi

Accord of 1975 on the grounds that Pakistan and the people of Jammu and Kashmir were not parties to it. The Jamaat raised the Kashmir issue asking for its solution through a plebiscite under the UN Charter. Even during the 1977 elections, Jamaat-e-Islami was critical of Sheikh Abdullah and advocated merger of the State with Pakistan. In 1977 Lok Sabha elections, it fielded two candidates, one each from Baramulla and Anantnag and one candidate in Jammu region from Udhampur, but failed to win any seat. However, the Jamaat-e-Islami candidates secured 38 per cent and 27 per cent of the valid votes in Baramulla and Anantnag respectively, whereas in Udhampur it obtained 6.1 per cent of the votes. In the subsequent State Assembly election

of 1977, Jamaat-e-Islami contested 19 seats, 17 in the Valley and 2 from Jammu. It could secure only one seat from Sopore receiving only 3.59 per cent of the votes. In 1983, it fielded 26 candidates without any success, though it secured 7 per cent of total votes. However, its party candidates did well in Sopore, Kupwara, Langet, Shopian, Rafiabad, Budgam and Doru securing 35, 19, 16, 27, 11, 8.5 and 12 per cent of votes respectively. It was in April 1979 that the Jamaat-e-Islami received great setback in the

aftermath of the hanging of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in Pakistan. Bhutto’s supporters damaged and destroyed the properties of Jamaat and its workers in the Valley. The Jamaat-e-Islami strongholds in Aarvan (Bijbehara), Tral, Bichur, Kulgam, Shopian, Sri Gophwara (falling in Anantnag district) and Bummai, Zalura villages in Baramulla district and in Pandan, Nawhatta of Srinagar district, were the main targets of such mob attacks, which included assaults on the Jamaat workers, axing of orchards, burning of houses and even some Jamaat madrassas. The party remained in a state of shock for quite some time. The Jamaat revived its activities after the Imam of Mecca, Sheikh Al Salaya of Saudi Arabia visited Kashmir in May 1980 and persuaded late Sheikh Abdullah not to obstruct Jamaat-e-Islami’s propagation of Wahhabi Islam in the State. The Jamaat skilfully utilized the presence of religious leaders from Islamic countries to elevate its status and emerge as a powerful political force in the Valley. The Jamaat-e-Islami was now more vigorous in its communal propaganda

through its units at various levels in mosques, madrassas, educational institutions and other front organizations. It questioned the accession of J & K with India and exhorted Kashmiri Muslims to launch jihad against India. They denounced the cardinal principles of Indian polity like secularism, democracy and socialism as un-Islamic concepts. They stood for the establishment of an Islamic order as the only means to achieve a final solution for Kashmir. Every social, economic or political issue was interpreted by these leaders in communal and pan-Islamic colours, even though the State government has remained in the hands of Muslim leaders ever since 1947. Jamaat-e-Islami now developed organizational links with Muslim organizations in Islamic countries of West Asia. In 1977, the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami – the Islami Jamaat-e-Tulba (IJT) was founded to develop transnational linkages with Islamist groups in India and abroad. In 1979, the IJT was admitted as member of the World Organisation of Muslim Youth. Jamaat and Tulba leaders attended conferences and seminars which were convened by international Islamic organizations in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Islamic countries. Jamaat-e-Islami also received a lot of funds from Islamic organizations for the spread of Islam, upliftment of Muslim students, construction of mosques, Islamic libraries and Islamic educational centres. In 1980, Jamaat-e-Tulba organized an international Islamic Conference in

Srinagar which was attended by important delegates from West Asia including the Imam of the mosques of Mecca and Medina. The IJT also wanted to pass a resolution calling upon Kashmiri Muslims to wage jihad against India.

To quote Praveen Swami, “by the end of the decade the IJT President, Sheikh Tajamul Hussain, called for the establishment of an Islamic state, through the medium of revolution.”9 All Islamic youth leaders of the world were invited to participate in it. Another large Islamic ijtemah (gathering) of Jamaat-eIslami took place at Idgah in Srinagar in September 1980. This was the triennial ijtemah attended by all Jamaat-e-Islami workers, members and sympathizers. The Jamaat cadres penetrated the administrative, revenue and police services and educational institutions. They started a mass campaign of indoctrination to wean away Kashmiri Muslims, particularly the young and educated professionals, from the indigenous traditions and towards full Islamization of Kashmiri society and politics. In 1985, the number of students enrolled in Jamaat-e-Islami schools was about 13,000, whereas this number was estimated to be around 33,000 in 1989. Flush with foreign funds mainly from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, Jamaat-e-Islami expanded its reach in the Valley. Following the death of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the tallest figure in Kashmir politics and leader of National Conference, the Jamaat-e-Islami and its front organizations, buttressed by a liberal flow of Gulf money, galvanized their activities in order to fill the political vacuum in the State. By 1986, the Jamaat had 10,000 hardcore members, 25,000 ordinary members and about 50,000 persons under its ideological influence.10 By 1989, Jamaate-Islami had gained significant success in wooing the youth of impressionable age through its network of schools. By early 1990, the total number of such schools was found to be 250 with 1,300 teaching staff and about 40,000 students. Lamenting this state of affairs, a prominent Kashmiri politician and author Peer Ghyas ud Din writes, “when intellectuals are under the fear of gun, fundamentalism in Kashmir is serving the interests of reactionary forcescorrupt bureaucrats, Mulllas and lumpens.”11