ABSTRACT
Islamic radicalism has become a serious problem in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Though these areas are bastions of moderate and traditional Islam and among the most secularized areas of the Muslim world, radicalism has made a forceful comeback in the past two decades. Beginning in the late 1980s, alien Islamic proselytizing gathered speed across the Muslim regions of the former Soviet Union, and has resulted in the spread of radical ideologies, militancy and even terrorism. Worst hit have been the Russian North Caucasus and some parts of Central Asia, especially the Ferghana Valley shared by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Why do Islamist terrorist organizations emerge? This question was inspired
by the appearance of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Central Asia. Since the end of the 1980s, Central Asian states have faced the emergence of terrorist Islamist organizations. This trend became particularly noticeable after the breakup of the Soviet Union and was equally important in all five Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. However, the Islamist terrorist organizations emerged only in Uzbekistan. The reasons for this lie in the country’s social, economic and political trajectories. Militant Islam did not exist in Central Asia since the seventh century when Arabs brought their religion to the region. The radicalization of Islam and the emergence of terrorist organizations in Central Asia are modern trends. During the last decade Central Asian states have undergone profound
economic and political changes caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Central Asian societies experienced a sharp decline in living standards, social disintegration and a deep ideological vacuum that led to the identity crises both for the elite and society at large. The collapse of the former Soviet Union exacerbated various social cleavages in each Central Asian country, revealing weak societal cohesion. Ethnic, clan and religious rivalries within each state undermined the legitimacy of the secular regimes and national security of the state. For that reason, Islam as a traditional religion of the Central Asian societies has become principally important. Many people turned to Islam as a source of a new identity that would unite them not only with their conationals but with the entire Muslim world. However, secular
regimes that replaced the communist government perceived Islam as a threat to their power. In particular, repression of religious organizations in Central Asia caused their radicalization and forced them to use previously forbidden forms of violence. External factors were equally important in the radicalization of Islam in
Central Asia. Penetration of radical ideas, literature and the rise of Islamist organizations became possible under Gorbachev’s “perestroika” when more opportunities emerged for the people to mobilize. The process deepened and accelerated in the beginning of the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union. The war in Afghanistan and later in Tajikistan exacerbated the rise of militant Islam in Central Asia. Central Asia has seen stronger external links, as foreign radical groups such
as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Al Qaeda have established a presence directly or through local allies. Adding to the problem, these groups in Central Asia have splintered into smaller entities difficult to identify let alone counteract. The causes of this radicalization are hotly debated. In the West, radicalization is often blamed on the socio-economic crisis, or political repression radicalizing the opposition forces. These explanations are only of limited validity. Complex post-Soviet identity crises, personal vendettas, regional rivalries, relative deprivation, and most importantly foreign proselytizing, are the factors which are widely underestimated in the West. To this should be added the criminalization of many of the most notorious militant armed groups, whose involvement in drug trafficking and other organized crime has been well documented. In Central Asia, the West has shown little understanding of the seriousness
of the radical and militant challenge faced by Central Asian states. Instead, the West has focused on the governments’ mismanagement of the situation, while refraining from responding to calls for assistance. This culminated in 2005 following the insurgency and crackdown in Andijan in Uzbekistan, which left several hundred people dead, mainly civilians. The result of the episode and the mismanagement of the crisis by both the Uzbek and Western governments was the loss of Western influence and presence in Uzbekistan. It is apparent that radical groups now seek to emulate the “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine, aware of the fact that popular rebellion against authoritarian governments attracts support and not condemnation from the West. Hence, several groups appear to have adapted to this environment and benefited from the deterioration in Uzbekistan’s relations with the West. In Central Asia, the focus of Islamic revival and of radical groups has
been the Ferghana Valley, a densely populated and ethnically mainly Uzbek territory divided politically between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The valley has traditionally been a center of Islamic fervor, and where foreign radicals first established a presence in this area. There are other factors besides tradition at work here. Aside from the Ferghana Valley, the main other localities of radicalism
have been Tajikistan and southern Kyrgyzstan. The spread of radical Islamic
political movements in Tajikistan in the 1980s was very much a result of the growing interaction between Afghanistan and Tajikistan during the Soviet occupation there. Islamic radicalism was the key force behind the resistance to the Soviet occupation, and spread to Tajikistan where important political movements on an Islamic basis emerged. South Kyrgyzstan is exposed to most of the same currents that prevail in neighboring Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. By contrast, northern Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have seen considerably lower levels of Islamic activity. Radical Islamic groups active in the region include groups across a political spectrum ranging from self-proclaimed peaceful groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat, to militant and terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Since 2001, there has been a clear and consistent trend toward the radica-
lization of HT. In June 2001, the HT publication Al-Waie (Consciousness) stated unequivocally that it is acceptable to carry out suicide attacks with explosive belts. In March 2002, HT argued that suicide bombs in Israel are a legitimate tactic of war. Over the next two years, HT leaflets and writings continuously emphasized that in the context of a clash of civilizations, offensive jihad against the Americans and the Jewish people is acceptable. It went as far as declaring, in a May 2003 leaflet, that jihad against unbelievers is the only type of jihad. An HT website displayed an image of American soldiers superimposed over the burning of the twin towers, carrying the legend “U.S. Troops: Die Hard.” It is yet to be established whether HT has already formed a militant wing or whether it is simply “inspiring” members independently to join terrorist groups or engage in terrorist acts.1
