ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that rather than considering atomic weapons an anachronism, the aim of China is to reach parity by enhancing the survivability of a relatively small number of weapons instead of building very large stockpiles. China's attitude towards nuclear weapons was mostly an uncomfortable embrace. The chapter deals with a concise historical account of the Chinese nuclear arms programme, subsequently elaborates on the concepts of no-first-use and minimal deterrence, and finally presents some of the consequences for international security. China has the technical capability to build multiple re-entry vehicles and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, which are important to penetrate missile defence systems. Minimal nuclear deterrence, however, does not imply that one has to minimize China's ambitions to shore up its military capabilities. Electronic warfare and sabotaging have been figuring prominently in China's operational handbooks for a long time. An important aspiration in this regard has been to 'blind' enemies by taking on their satellites.
