ABSTRACT
The relationship between the European Union (EU) and sport is paradoxical and complex, which certainly makes any attempt at parsimonious analysis diffi cult. This is due to a series of circumstances that are necessary to mention beforehand as a way of introduction. First, a constitutional constraint conditions any EU approach to sport because, until the ratifi cation of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, it has no direct competence in the matter. Until 2009 sport had been an exclusive competence of the Member States and, some would also argue, of the so-called sporting movement (sport non-governmental organisations). This, however, has not prevented sport from appearing in the EU political agenda relatively often, especially since the well known Bosman ruling in 1995 (García, 2007a). However, the constraint has now disappeared with the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which includes a direct competence on sport for the EU, albeit at a very basic level. This is discussed later in the chapter. Second, given that constitutional constraint, the EU has tended to approach sport indirectly through the regulatory policies of the Single European Market (SEM). This has led Tokarski, Steinbach, Petry, and Jesse (2004) to differentiate between direct and indirect EU sports policy, the former being relatively modest and patchy, whereas the latter focuses on the economic and legal aspects of professional sport. Third, the European Union has been characterised as a multi-level and multi-institutional political system (Marks & Hooghe, 2004; Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996; Hix, 2003). Policy-making in the EU involves a great number of actors, and it would be incorrect to assume that their preferences are easily aligned. In the case of sport, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the European Parliament, the Commission and the Member States (meeting either in the Council of Ministers or the European Council) have differing views of sport. Even within the European Commission one can fi nd contrasting internal approaches to sport. The result is a heterogeneous policy community that makes generalisations about EU policy on sport very diffi cult. Fourth, it is now acknowledged and accepted that, despite diversity, there are two main (and contrasting) views of sport
among EU institutions that have developed over time (Parrish 2003a, 2003b): sport as an economic activity in need of regulation when it affects the SEM, and sport as a socio-cultural activity with important implications for civil society, identities and culture throughout the EU. Due to the complex institutional structure of the EU, neither of these visions has real prevalence over the other. This depends on the circumstances of each particular situation. Thus, the implications, tensions and evolution of these two views can explain a large majority of EU decisions in sport. Finally, sport non-governmental organisations have been reluctant to engage with EU institutions in order to protect their alleged autonomy from the political sphere. Yet, they have had no real option other than to enter into dialogue with the different institutions and to become active members of the young sports policy community in the EU.
