ABSTRACT
Looking at the current Turkish political landscape one can draw two diametrically opposing pictures reflecting the deep cleavage in almost every walk of life since the election of the former Islamist Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or AKP) to office in 2002. Those who see things from the perspective of the secular establishment – comprising a military-led network of the top echelons of the judiciary and the academia; the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi or CHP); former President of the Republic Ahmet Necdet Sezer (2000-7); military-friendly non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and think tanks; older middle classes; and some of the centre-right politicians – regard the AKP government as representing ‘the crisis’ of the secular regime. Claiming the existence of a hidden Islamist agenda behind its seemingly democratic policy proposals, they believe that the AKP undermines the secular republic and should not be entrusted with power. Hence, since 2002, almost no day has passed without the secular establishment drawing attention to the AKP’s acts undermining the secular regime. These acts can be as wide-range as moving the headquarters of the Central Bank from Ankara to Istanbul;2 distribution of alcohol-free wet towels on Turkish Airlines flights (Hürriyet 2008b; Çölaşan 2006); defending the right to wear a headscarf on university campuses; Europeanization and democratization reforms; preparing a constitutional draft and advocating an Anglo-Saxon version of secularism.
