ABSTRACT
Dual-process theories dominate contemporary research on human reasoning (e.g., Evans, 2007a; Sloman, 2002; Stanovich, 2004) and embody the notion that reasoning reflects a sophisticated interplay between processes that are fast, automatic, low effort, and high capacity on the one hand, and processes that are slow, controlled, high effort and resource limited on the other hand. The first mention of dual processes in the reasoning literature seems to be traceable to Jonathan Evans’ paper with Peter Wason, published in the mid1970s, that focused on the famous four-card selection task (see Wason & Evans, 1975). There is little doubt that many fundamental concepts that form a part of dual-process theorizing have derived from Evans’ major programme of research on this topic over the 30 years or so following the publication of this paper. Indeed, a core motivation behind the present chapter is to pay tribute to the multiplicity of valuable dual-process ideas that Evans has contributed to the reasoning domain over the past three decades and to which he is still actively contributing (e.g., see Evans, Chapter 19, this volume).
