ABSTRACT
The biblical rivers of the Fertile Crescent, the Euphrates and Tigris, surrounding the Garden of Eden, both have their source in the north-eastern region of Turkey. The Euphrates-Tigris basin is situated primarily in three countries: Turkey, Syria and Iraq, Iran being an upstream riparian of some Tigris tributaries and usually not involved in the multipartite river basin conflicts. The Euphrates-Tigris’ catchment area comprises 35,600 sq km, with the
vast majority of the discharge coming from the snow-capped mountains in Turkey’s Anatolia region. The Euphrates on average carries significantly more water than the Tigris. The basin’s water resource development has a millenniaold history manifest in the early irrigator cultures of the Babylonian and Sumerian empires. Both the Tigris and the Euphrates originate in Turkey, which contributes
the vast majority of the flow to the Euphrates. The two rivers account for a third of Turkey’s surface water supply. The Euphrates flows into Syria before joining the Tigris in Southern Iraq. The Tigris flows as the natural border between Syria and Turkey and later into Iran before draining into Iraq to form the Shatt-al-Arab, which finally drains into the Arabian Gulf. The Euphrates in Turkey has four major tributaries: the Karasu, the
Murat, the Munzur and the Peril. After leaving Turkey, the Euphrates has only one important tributary, the Khabur, which joins the main stream in Syria. Turkey also contributes to a great deal of the waters of the Tigris but in a less important way than to the waters of the Euphrates. The Tigris has four main tributaries: the Great Zab, the Lesser Zab, the Diyala and the Adhaim, all joining the main stream in Iraq. The lengths of the main streams are 2,330 km for the Euphrates, 1,718 km for the Tigris, and 190 km for the Shatt al-Arab. Although Turkey has abundant water resources compared to its Middle
Eastern neighbours, they are unevenly distributed (seasonal and geographic variations of precipitations are characteristic of the region), with most of the precipitation falling in the mountainous regions in the north-east of the country. The flows of both rivers are quite variable from one season to another and/or from one year to another. The natural flow of the Euphrates is generally estimated at around 30m. cu m at the Turkish-Syrian border and 31-32m. cu m at the Syrian-Iraqi border. The Tigris river in Turkey has an annual natural average flow of around 20-21m. cu m. In Iraq, where the
Tigris is joined by important tributaries, the annual average flow can amount to a maximum of 70m. cu m. The region has already faced high political tensions over water-related
issues-the share of the Tigris and Euphrates and also the question of the use of the Orontes river (shared by Lebanon and Syria, as upstreamers, and Turkey), over land (the province of Hatay annexed by Turkey in 1939 and still claimed by Syria), over border security relating to Kurdish autonomy efforts in both Turkey and Iraq, and over Syria’s support of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party). The invasion of Iraq by the USA-led coalition in 2003 and the end of Saddam Hussein’s regime created uncertainty about the future of relations between the states in the region. The three basin states have experienced conflict regarding their use and share of the water resources of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers since the 1960s. The three states rely heavily on the resources of these rivers in order to assure the development of their agriculture, energy production and thus their economy. Turkey’s upstream position on these rivers and its claim to absolute sovereignty over the waters springing within its territory are a source of tensions within the basin. From the 1930s, the Turkish Government felt that the Tigris and Euphrates
rivers had great potential for irrigation and energy development. Turkey relies heavily on the waters of these two rivers because it wants to develop its agriculture and its energy production to assure its economic growth. Since 1977 projects relating to these rivers have been gathered in one multi-
sectoral single project. Located on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in Turkey, the GAP (Güneydog˘u Anadolu Projesi, often referred to as the Greater Anatolia Project) is the most important investment and development project undertaken by the Turkish authorities. The GAP area lies in south-eastern Turkey and straddles nine provinces. The GAP is first and foremost seen as a way to exploit the resources of south-east Anatolia and to develop this region, which is characterized by higher population growth rates and lower GDP per capita than other regions in Turkey. The GAP is conceived as a way to eliminate the interregional social and economic disparities within Turkish borders. The optimal use of land and water resources is considered as an important means to achieve this objective. The GAP area represents about 10% of Turkey’s surface area. If the GAP were fully implemented, 21 dams, 19 hydroelectric power plants and two irrigation tunnels would be built on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and their tributaries. The Ataturk Dam and the Sanliurfa Tunnel System (conveying water for agriculture to fertile but dry plains), the centrepieces of the project, are already completed and in operation, whereas another mega-construction in the region-the Ilisu Dam-is presently being questioned by the international community and donors, as well as by local citizens who would be driven off their land (and potentially resettled) if the construction went ahead. The financing of the costly GAP infrastructure has always been an impor-
tant and difficult issue for Turkey. In 1994, compliance with multilateral liberalization, privatization and structural adjustment policies allowed the
country to receive World Bank loans to secure construction activities. In recent years, the funding has again become problematic as international donors and investment companies face strong and co-ordinated protest from internationally operating non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Turkish civil society actors who claim that the social (resettlement), environmental (decrease of downstream flows and diminished water quality caused by agricultural drainage), historical (flooding of archaeological sites of interest in Turkish valleys) and regional (depriving downstreamers of their vital water supply) effects are too severe to be compensated for by the weak and limited improvements in agricultural or energy production. Since Turkey’s GAP project is designed to improve the control and use of
the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, it inevitably reduces the quantity and quality of water flowing into Syria and Iraq-and thus adds to the tensions between the river riparians. Syria itself has ambitions to further improve its agricultural productivity
and its electricity generation in order to develop its economy. It relies heavily on the waters of the Euphrates and has built dams-the Tabqa being the best known-and power plants in order to secure water supply. As a downstream riparian, Syria continuously voices its fears of becoming completely dependent on Turkey’s use of the waters of the Euphrates and protests in international fora, as the terms of water allocation can be dictated by Turkey (in theory, the storage capacity of Turkish dams is large enough to cut off the river flows for several months!). The tensions between Syria and Iraq reached their peak when Syria filled
Lake Assad reservoir and consequently reduced the flow of the Euphrates dramatically. In 1975, Iraq accused Syria of holding back water and asked the Arab League to intervene. Syria, dissatisfied with the negotiation process, pulled out of the Arab
League Committee formed to mediate the conflict. By the end of May 1975, the dispute had escalated to a more serious level and threatened to turn violent. Syria closed its borders and airspace to Iraq, and both countries transferred troops to their mutual borders. Saudi Arabia mediated in the conflict, and a deal was reached. Although the agreement was not made public, it is said that Syria agreed to keep 40% of the water from the Euphrates river within its borders and to let the remaining 60% flow into Iraq. In 1990, this agreement was updated, but there is uncertainty about actual compliance with the contracts on account of the unclear political scenario in Iraq. Iraq is in a particular situation as it has been exposed to years of war with Iran and invasions by the multinational coalitions during the Gulf Wars. Its development has been rendered difficult by these events, and much hydraulic infrastructure has been destroyed (dams, water purification and pumping installations, distribution facilities). Iraq, characterized by its oil economy and by its significant food imports, tried during the 1980s to develop its agriculture in order to assure at least modest food security with an important dam construction programme, and thus also relied on the waters of the Tigris
and Euphrates rivers. The use of these rivers and water allocation by its upstream neighbours is important for Iraq as these water resources will certainly play their role in its reconstruction. In summary, the three basin states rely heavily and increasingly (as a result
of demographic growth) on the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers to assure their development or to cope with future challenges. It is important to note that water became a regional issue when the three riparians began to initiate major development projects, the downstream riparians being first to realize their projects in the 1970s for fear of upstream appropriation. As water-sharing has already been the source of tensions and conflict, some
authors argue that water disputes could lead to more serious situations in the future. Nevertheless, some steps have been taken in favour of co-operation in the form of bilateral agreements relating to other political issues in the region, such as Turkish aspirations to become an EU member, or US interest in secured water supply for Iraq, where global interests are affected. However, a trilateral accord is still lacking (see also Chapter 6 of this book).
