ABSTRACT

The three rivers, although separate hydrologic systems, share a common terminus in the Bay of Bengal and together cover a large part of the Indian subcontinent. The tributaries and main branches of the sacred rivers (the Ganges and the Brahmaputra in the Hindu religion) spring in the Indian, Nepali and Tibetan Autonomous Region of China’s Himalayas; the total drainage area covers parts of China, Myanmar, Nepal, India and Bangladesh, and all of Bhutan, with altogether 1,634,900 sq km of surface area. The flow of the three main rivers is characterized by seasonal floods caused

by monsoon rains and snowmelt in the Himalaya. This causes frequent flooding in the deltaic regions of Bangladesh (the majority of the nation lies in the delta) and India, as well as the delivery of fertile silt and pollutants originating from unregulated sewerage use, agricultural runoff and industrial activities. Bangladesh is the downstream nation of this multinational transborder river basin, and is regularly affected by the effects of monsoon floods and dry season droughts (from awater-quantity viewpoint) and severe pollution by all riparian states and sectors. The basins cover approximately 10% of the earth’s surface area, home to

500,000m. people and also two-fifths of the poor of the developing world. However, because of the constant delivery of fertile silt from the geologically active and young Himalayas and the river headwaters, and the abundance of water during the monsoon period (when, during a couple of months, rains accumulate water depths of up to several metres!), since ancient times the basin has been considered the breadbasket of the subcontinent. The expectations, interests and objectives conceived by the riparian states

concerning water resources development are a result of the combination of climatic conditions, the topography, the socio-economic situation, riparian position and state of development experienced by the respective co-basin state. Numerous water-related concerns are evident in the basins along the rivers’

flows until they drain into the Bay of Bengal. Interests include navigational uses, irrigation, drinking water, domestic as well as industrial uses and, increasingly in recent decades, the generation of hydropower. The three separate river basins link the basin states hydrologically (especially the Ganges and Brahmaputra between India and Bangladesh), and contested issues are highly related (a problemshed). However, from a river basin management perspective it makes sense to treat the main river basins separately in order to

achieve successes stepwise, as the riparians along the transnational watercourses have differing agendas. For the sake of clarity, we will do this in the following section, while acknowledging that, for Bangladesh, as the downstream nation situated at the confluence of all three international rivers, the ‘complete’ river basin approach to co-operation and conflict resolution may still be the most logical way to go. Bangladesh strongly favours basin-wide river management regimes, which is a comprehensible position given the downstream riparian’s weak negotiating position. However, India has opted for the negotiation of bilateral accords to avoid multilateral agreements that would potentially oblige it to make more extensive concessions to its neighbours. India plays a major part in the hydropolitics of the basin, as it does in the

case of the Indus basin. This is partially a result of its midstream position along the Ganges (relative to upstream Nepal and downstream Bangladesh), but also of its influential role as a hydro-hegemony in the whole region’s problemshed. Nepal, as another major contributor to the Ganges’ discharge, is in an optimal situation concerning the potential for hydropower generation. However, co-operation between India and Nepal on the mutual develop-

ment of water resources was difficult for decades until the 1996 signing of the Mahakali Treaty in relation to the transboundary tributary; however, despite the agreement, to date the treaty has not been implemented. Thus, a perceived breaking-of-the-ice and changes of co-operation paradigms between the two neighbours about agreed water resource exploitation and mutual benefitsharing has not been achieved. Although this process was beneficial for both riparians despite their very different objectives, the potential development benefits that could easily be generated by hydropower development (which, in the form of a storage dam, as opposed to run-of-the-river system, would at the same time constitute flood control options and the opportunity for dry season flow augmentation to flush the massive silt deposits delivered from the mountains) are yet to be realized. Co-operation of this kind exists between India and Bhutan, where the small

kingdom as an upstream riparian realized the benefits of co-operation on hydropower generation along a Brahmaputra tributary by engaging in joint construction efforts and concluding a contract for the sale of surplus energy to India. China and India, the region’s superpowers in economic as well as in mili-

tary terms, have had difficult political relations, and the atmosphere between the two remains relatively tense; thus the water resource issue is largely untouched in bilateral talks, which are characterized by rivalry about influence in the region. In light of the gigantic water transfer projects from China’s southern territories to the closed river basins in the north of the country, transfers from the Brahmaputra basin are also envisaged, as well as the construction of gargantuan reservoirs for hydropower generation. The most famous bone of contention is the Farakka barrage situated several

kilometres upstream of the Indian-Bangladeshi border. It was unilaterally designed and constructed by India and completed in 1974. The purpose was

to provide low-saline water for the city of Kolkata situated on the southern end of the river known as Bhagirati or Hooghly and, at the same time, to allow flushing of silt out of Kolkata port to avoid increased dredging and to provide continued navigability during the dry season. For downstream riparian Bangladesh, the effect of water diversion during the dry season is decreased water availability and quality on account of a higher level of salinity in the groundwater, caused geologically by arsenic from aquifer sediments. The basins’ water issues can thus be summarized as: a) the utilization of

water for power generation; and b) the regulation of flows over time. The two are intrinsically linked by the engineering approach to dam construction. However, the potential benefits of flood management for the flood-prone areas of Bangladesh and the north-western federal states of India, as well as the massive increase in low-cost energy availability for all riparians, come at a certain price. The sites considered as being suitable for dam construction have been identified by all riparians on their respective territories. Besides the considerable risks of construction failures of dam walls in a tectonically active zone such as the Himalayas, there is the major threat of losing a whole range of monsoon mountain ecosystems in the event of all the envisaged dam sites being commissioned in the future. This ecological aspect weighs as heavily as the social questions relating to the inundation of valleys, where the flooding implies resettlement and hence the destruction of community structures. The pressing questions about how to develop the basins’ water resources

thus have to be balanced by all stakeholders in the basin, because interventions, as well as the non-intervention (at least not on a large scale) found today, affect both riparian communities and the fate of whole nations, which could, through wise interlinking of flood protection, irrigation and a basin-wide energy grid, take a considerable step forward in ensuring their access to the energy resources necessary for economic development.