ABSTRACT
The Australian constitutional system and parliamentary law establish fascinatingly unpredictable checks and balances that modify the executive’s potential for dominating the legislative process. So, while the Constitution concentrates executive power in the government, legislative power is dispersed almost equally between the House of Representatives and the Senate, the former being elected by the majoritarian alternative vote (AV) system, and the latter by the proportional single transferable vote (STV). This means that representation in the House is monopolised by the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the right-of-centre ‘Coalition’ of Liberals and Nationals, whose partisan rivalry dominates the chamber, in the Senate minor parties usually hold the balance of power thereby weakening the power of the dominant party blocs to control the chamber (Galligan 1995, chs. 2 and 3; Uhr 1998, ch. 5).1 Indeed, with government typically dominating the lower house but without a majority in the upper house, a de facto legislative division of labour has emerged: the House provides the arena for the familiar partisan clashes between the government and opposition while normally undertaking limited legislative scrutiny; and the Senate adopts a more active role scrutinizing legislation, not least through its extensive and active committee system.2 With strong party discipline and rebellions exceptionally rare, a Commonwealth government can ordinarily win House passage of its legislation with ease. The same cannot be said of the Senate; governments of both major parties have been frustrated by their inability to get their legislation passed by the upper house unscathed.
