ABSTRACT
THE traditional problem of the freedom of the will is about whether men are ever responsible for the things they do, in the sense that they are subject to praise and blame for some of their actions. Quite clearly, in some cases they are not; and we think they are not because of the kind of explanations we are able to give for their actions. On the other hand, in those cases where men are regarded as responsible for what they do, their acts are hardly thought of as inexplicable: rather, where men are responsible their acts can be explained, but by a different kind of explanation from those appropriate when they are not responsible. The problem is that we find it difficult to say precisely which kind of explanations rule out, and which allow, responsibility, and why. As a result of this, doubt can arise as to whether we are ever responsible for any of our acts. This doubt may arise in two ways, requiring two different sorts of answer. First, it may be thought that those kinds of explanation of human actions which, when they apply, appear to rule out responsibility, always apply. Secondly, it may be thought that those explanations of human action which do apply in those cases in which we attribute responsibility turn out, on closer inspection, and paradoxically, to rule out responsibility.
