ABSTRACT
The founding of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 was significant as it was the first region-wide security institution involving all major powers in the region. With an uncertain post-Cold War regional security environment, the ARF was expected to ‘[develop] a more predictable constructive pattern of relationships for the Asia-Pacific region’ (Leifer 1996: 22). The ARF however has not made good progress over the past 15 years. Even optimistic observers have acknowledged that the Forum suffers from serious stagnation (Khong and Nesadurai 2007: 37). Frustrations over the Forum’s slow institutionalization have been especially strong among participating countries that initially had high expectations about its role in regional security. Japan, which made a significant contribution to creating the ARF and was one of its strong supporters, is no exception to this. With increasing disappointment over its stagnation, Japan’s interest in the ARF has significantly waned. Indeed, the Forum has in recent years seldom become the subject of Japan’s foreign policy debates in the way that it did in the early 1990s. What were Japan’s initial expectations for the ARF? What roles has Japan played in the evolution of the ARF? Has Japan’s approach to the ARF changed with its growing discontentment over the Forum’s ineffectiveness? This chapter explores Japan’s changing perspectives and policy towards the ARF over the decade since its formation. It begins by clarifying Japan’s initial view of the Forum and examines Japanese motivations, expectations, and objectives for promoting a region-wide security institution during the early 1990s. It also looks into Japan’s role in the ARF since its foundation and highlights the achievements and limitations of the ARF from a Japanese perspective. Finally, the chapter examines how Japan’s experiences in the ARF for the past 15 years have changed Tokyo’s initial view of and approach towards the Forum. This chapter argues that, although Japan contributed significantly to the development of the ARF in its first five years as an active mediator between activist and reluctant countries, Tokyo has been less energetic in recent
years due to disappointing experiences in the Forum. Its mediation was largely rendered ineffective because of difficulties in searching for middle ground between parties and the ARF’s operating rules that stem from the ‘ASEAN way’. Nonetheless, Japan remains committed to the Forum as it still serves a number of Tokyo’s security policy objectives to some extent. Considering its lowered expectations for the ARF, however, it is unlikely that Japan will allocate more resources to its ARF policy unless the Forum makes tangible progress on security cooperation.
