ABSTRACT
Barely two years after it was established in July 1994 under the auspices of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was already seen as ‘in danger of being fractured and bypassed by events in Burma and other parts of Asia that it cannot handle’ (Richardson 1996). In 1997, it was asserted (Narine 1997: 962) that ‘ASEAN is an inappropriate model for the ARF’ because ‘the political, economic, and strategic considerations that have made ASEAN a success within Southeast Asia do not necessarily apply to the more powerful states of the Asia-Pacific region’. In 1998, it was declared (Lim 1998: 115) that ‘the ARF can do little to promote security because ASEAN insists on its primacy in it’. In 1999, it was predicted that ‘if ASEAN continues to chair the ARF, the dialogue could stagnate’ (Henderson 1999: 70). Similar criticisms have continued to be heard over the next decade even until today. Indeed, the centrality and the leadership quality of ASEAN within the ARF process has been a major focus of criticisms. As Michael Leifer (1996: 59) pointed out, for example, ‘ASEAN’s insistence on retaining the central diplomatic role in the ARF . . . generates frustration among Northeast Asian and Pacific participants’. Yet, the ARF continues to survive, and little change has come about regarding the place and role of ASEAN within the grouping. After 15 years, ASEAN still asserts its central place in the ARF either as ‘the primary driving force’ or being in ‘the driver’s seat’. Despite these criticisms ASEAN is unlikely to give up its managerial role in the ARF. Even so, it is unlikely that any of the present ARF participants, including those who are increasingly and frustratingly dissatisfied with the ‘ineffectiveness’, utility, and progress of the grouping, would soon desert and quit the ARF. In other words, it seems that ASEAN will continue to manage the ARF, and non-ASEAN states will keep on participating in the process. This chapter is divided into four parts. The first explores the nature of ASEAN’s role in the ARF. The second examines the evolution of the ARF’s process by looking at how ASEAN has tried to manage both its
agenda setting and implementation, and how the latter have been viewed by non-ASEAN member states. The third part highlights the genesis of the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) idea and the ASEAN Charter within the context of ASEAN’s role in the ARF. The final part of the chapter discusses the challenges facing ASEAN in sustaining its role as ‘the primary driving force’ of the ARF, especially within the context of ASEAN’s tenuous process of consolidation and institutionalisation.
