ABSTRACT
The seas and chokepoints of Southeast Asia have been a focus of regional security concern since the 1980s. The end of the Cold War gave littoral states, and China, the political space to press their conflicting maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea and the Celebes Sea. In the late 1990s, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) also began to portray piracy in the chokepoints of the region, especially the Malacca and Singapore Straits, as an ‘existential threat’ to commercial shipping. However, the most significant event that impacted on maritime security was the 9/11 attacks against the U.S. Consequently, the United States began to emphasize the threat posed globally to shipping by potential maritime terrorists. The U.S. and its regional allies, including Japan and Singapore, argued that there existed a nexus between piracy and terrorism, and that the greatest danger was to international traffic using the Straits of Malacca and other chokepoints in Southeast Asia (Luft and Korin 2004). In 2004, the U.S. announced its Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), which included the possibility of its Navy helping to police and secure the ‘vulnerable’ Straits of Malacca (Weatherbee 2006). Before this, it launched its Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in 2003 as part of a worldwide attempt to interdict and control the movement of weapons of mass destruction by sea. Meanwhile, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) also made maritime cooperation a central plank in its security agenda. Thus the 2003 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) stated unequivocally that:
Maritime issues and concerns are transboundary in nature, and therefore shall be addressed regionally in holistic, integrated and comprehensive manner. Maritime cooperation between and among ASEAN member countries shall contribute to the evolution of the ASEAN Security Community.
