ABSTRACT
International politics in the second half of the twentieth century was characterized by superpower rivalry. Korea fell a victim to superpower rivalry most conspicuously in the Korean War (1950-53) and the North Korean nuclear crisis (1993 to the present).1 The Korean War broke out and was fought at the early stage of superpower rivalry, becoming the first ‘hot war’ in the Cold War era. In contrast, the North Korean nuclear crisis – the first in the early 1990s and the second still in progress since 2002 – erupted in the post-Cold War era. This essay purports to explain the KoreanWar and the North Korean nuclear
crisis in terms of how Korea was victimized by superpower rivalry and its remaining legacy and points out the coming of a great opportunity for resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis through US-North Korean and the Six-Party Talks negotiations. In the first part, I will explain the character of the Korean War in terms of
civil/international war by observing the North Korean state makers’ instinct to establish an exclusive authority in the whole Korean Peninsula and by analysing the Soviet and Chinese help to plan and execute the war for North Korea and the US and U.N. help for South Korea in fighting the war. Finally, I will look at the legacies the Korean War and superpower rivalry left in Korea, East Asia, and the world. In the second part, I will examine the North Korean nuclear crisis, the
legacy of the Korean War and superpower rivalry. First, I will examine the first and second North Korean nuclear crisis in terms of how North Korea and the US confronted each other. But the examination will focus more on the second crisis, which is still in progress. Concretely, I will review and analyse President Bush’s ‘ABC’ (anything but Clinton) policy toward North Korea, the September 19 Joint Statement, the US financial sanctions on North Korea’s deposits at the Banco Delta Asia (BDA), the February 13 initial actions agreement, the October 3 second-phase actions agreement, and the recent press communiqué of the Heads of Delegation Meeting of the Six-Party Talks in July 2008. Then I will evaluate the achievements of the two actions-related
nuclear agreements. Finally, I will put forth suggestions for the successful denuclearization of North Korea and the end to the victimization of Korea.
