ABSTRACT
The most important fallout of the Cold War and the consequent superpower rivalry was that many Asian and African countries became pawns in their larger struggle for world dominance. Vietnam was seen initially by both the superpowers as unimportant, but because of its geographical location, it became crucial to both – for the United States, first as a useful arms conduit to Chiang Kai Sheik’s anti-Communist forces for furthering its policy in China in the 1930s, then in its competition with Japan for dominance in the Pacific, and finally in its increasingly strident anti-Communist crusade; and for the Soviet Union in its struggle against imperialism and in its desire to expand world Communism. The effect of the ideological rivalry of the superpowers had been quite debilitating for nation building and economic development of Vietnam. In August of 1945, at the end of World War II, the nationalist movement of
the Viet Minh, successor of the Indochinese Communist Party, seized power in Hanoi, Hue, and Saigon, for the Viet Minh had developed a military force and popular base during the Japanese occupation of Vietnam, and it quickly moved to secure political authority before the imminent arrival of the Allied powers. Emperor Bao Dai, the Japanese puppet, abdicated in late August, and on 2 September 1945, Viet Minh leader Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnam’s independence as the democratic Republic of Vietnam. For eight years, Vietnam was a colonial battleground – as France fought a nationalist movement led by Ho Chi Minh. This colonial war between the French Union’s Expeditionary Corps and Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh turned into a Cold War crisis in January 1950. The Viet Minh received support from the newly proclaimed Republic of China and the Soviet Union while France and the newly created Vietnamese National Army received support from the United States. Despite financial backing from the United States, the French lost control of Vietnam in 1954 – after a Vietnamese force captured the French outpost at Dien Bien Phu. This war was significant in that it demonstrated that a western colonial power could be defeated by an indigenous revolutionary force. The Battle of Dien Bien Phu started on 13 March, and continued during the Conference held in Geneva to end the first Vietnam war. Its issue became a strategic turnover as both sides wanted to emerge as the victor in order to be in a favourable
position during the planned negotiations about ‘the Indochinese problem’. After fighting for 57 days the besieged French garrison was overrun and all French central positions were captured by the Viet Minh. On 27 April 1954, the Conference produced a declaration which supported
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Indochina thereby granting its independence from France. In addition, the Conference declaration agreed upon the cessation of hostilities and foreign involvement (or troops) in internal Indochina affairs. Northern and southern zones were drawn into which opposing troops were to withdraw, to facilitate the cessation of hostilities between the Vietnamese forces and those that had supported the French. Viet Minh units, having advanced to the far south while fighting the French, retreated from these positions, in accordance with the Agreement, to north of the ceasefire line, awaiting unification on the basis of internationally supervised free elections to be held in July 1956. Most of the French Union forces evacuated Vietnam, although much of the regional governmental infrastructure in the South was the same as it had been under the French administration. An International Control Commission was set up to oversee the implementation of the Geneva Accords, but it was basically powerless to ensure compliance. It was to consist of India, Canada, and Poland. The agreement was between Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, France, Laos, the People’s Republic of China, the State of Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. The United States took note and acknowledged the agreement, but refused to sign it, relieving it from being legally bound to it. The Geneva Agreement carefully worded the division of northern and south-
ern Vietnam as a ‘provisional military demarcation line’, ‘on either side of which the forces of the two parties shall be regrouped after their withdrawal’. To specifically put aside any notion that it was a partition, they further stated, in the Final Declaration, Article 6: ‘The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Vietnam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary.’ Then the US Under-Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith said, ‘In connection with the statement in the Declaration concerning free elections in Vietnam, my government wishes to make clear its position which it has expressed in a Declaration made in Washington on 29 June 1954, as follows: ‘In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek unity through free elections, supervised by the United Nations to ensure they are conducted fairly.’1 The Geneva Conference therefore made only a provisional division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel, with control of the north given to the Viet Minh as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh, and the south becoming the State of Vietnam under Emperor Bao Da. i. A year later, Bao Da. i would be deposed by his prime minister, Ngo Dình Diem, creating the Republic of Vietnam. Diem refused to hold the national elections, noting that the State of Vietnam never signed the Geneva Accord and went about attempting to crush all remnant of Communist opposition.
