ABSTRACT
Protracted ideological battles, because they involve the minds of people and societies, leave deeper scars and memories than military ones. The effort involved by the protagonists to establish that they are right and the adversary is wrong, encompasses and sometimes overwhelms entire societies, which then press into service every means, rather than just men, at their disposal. Political parties, universities, the media and every other agency or body that can influence the outcome is utilized. This is what happened between 1945 and 1990, the period of the Cold War. It is worth noting, though, that while the war might have been cold for the two main adversaries – the USA and the USSR – for many others, notably in the developing counties in Latin America, Asia and Africa, it was quite hot enough. Indeed, even the USA and the USSR got involved in hot wars, albeit not against each other. Between 1964 and 1975, the US got its comeuppance in Vietnam and between 1980 and 1990 the USSR got its in Afghanistan. The organizers of the colloquium on which this edited volume is basedwanted
to explore if the mistakes of the twentieth century could be avoided in the twenty-first. This first requires us to define a mistake, because it presupposes that a choice was available and the wrong choice was made. But what if there was no choice and only one course of action open and it was only in hindsight that it turned out to be a mistake because of a whole range of reasons that were neither known, not anticipated at the time the decision was taken? Therefore, it makes sense not to use the word mistake too loosely or at least
without first establishing that there were indeed alternative courses of action open at the time when the decisions were made. Going into that debate will not just be tedious and hugely time-consuming but also not very productive for the purposes of this essay.
